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INTRODUCTION
“The respect for human rights is nowadays not so much a matter of having international
standards, but rather questions of compliance with those standards.”
(Michelle Bachelet, Former President of Chile)
The Southern Cone—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay—endured some of
the most devastating dictatorships in world history. Thirty-thousand men, women, and children
disappeared during the Argentine dictatorship while the Chilean population faced 17 years under
Augusto Pinochet’s commanding military rule. While 30 years have passed since the end of
these long-lasting dictatorships, the effects linger in the lives of the victims, their family
members, and the societies as a whole.
Extensive and gruesome human rights violations occurred throughout the
institutionalized state violence during these dictatorships. Some examples include the illegal
kidnapping and detention of individuals, physical torture, sexual abuse, psychological
manipulation, disappearances, and executions. The abuse continues to the present day as
countless individuals live with the perpetual mental anguish of unanswered questions regarding
the whereabouts of loved ones and, in the case of Argentina, the lost children of those captured.
When the dictatorships ended in Argentina and Chile, in 1982 and 1990 respectively, the
first civilian governments faced many challenges of confronting these abuses. As will be
highlighted throughout this paper, the governments had drastically different approaches to this
task as a result of varying circumstances, history, societal responses, and international pressures.
Using Argentina and Chile as case studies, this essay will articulate such differences, propose
and analyze certain hypotheses that might explain the distinctions, and provide a comprehensive
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answer to the question: Why do civilian governments of newly democratic countries respond
differently to the human rights violations that occurred during their dictatorships?
Newly democratic countries respond to the human rights violations that occurred during
its past dictatorship according to a variety of factors, specifically the severity of violence during
the dictatorial period, the type of transition to democracy, the legal status post-dictatorship, the
power of the executive, international pressure, and the justice policies elsewhere. Therefore, this
paper ultimately argues that countries vary in their responses as a result of differences in any one
of these variables. This thesis also acknowledges that other factors not evaluated may also
impact the responses of governments.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Scholars have debated similar questions regarding how countries transition from periods
of authoritarianism to democracy, specifically after dictatorships; the type of democracy that
emerges; the potential paths to justice after human rights violations during these periods; and the
influence of the international community in searching for justice. One must first understand the
previous literature and findings of scholars in order to analyze specific cases.

Type of Transitions
One important factor in this field of study regards the type of transition to democracy.
Guillermo O’Donnell divided the possibilities in two: with a pact, also called a consensus, or
without a pact referred to as by force or collapse.1 A transition by consensus implies one where
the ruling armed forces negotiate their terms for their exit from power with the civil society and

1

Daniel Mazzei, “Reflexiones sobre la transición democrática argentina,” PolHis 4, no. 7 (2011): 11.
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political parties that will soon retake the government. Therefore, by contrast, the armed forces do
not have this ability in a transition by collapse.
Many scholars have expanded on this duality, discussing the implications of this division
and what might influence which path a departing dictatorship takes. Daniel Mazzei and Carlos
Santiago Nino emphasize the etiology, or “the types of factors that ignite the transition process,”
as important to distinguishing the modality or which transition occurs. The etiology of a
transition may be endogenous or exogenous depending on the factors—internal or external—that
triggered the democratization.2 Mazzei states, “A transition by collapse is produced… after an
external military defeat or after a profound internal crisis of the authoritarian regime,” signifying
mainly exogenous factors.3 Scholars have discovered that transitions via consensus result in “a
continuity of the structures, elites, and political practices of the authoritarian regimes” who can
then help rebuild the new democracy and “direct the pace of transition and preserve the
prerogatives they have obtained” whereas transitions by collapse result in a defeated armed
forces with little to no power who must work within the newly created system.4
Regarding a transition by consensus, Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo discuss the
benefits of creating a constitution to negotiate the authoritarian regime’s terms of removal. As
mentioned above, scholars argue that a consensus transition results in minimal prosecutions
because of the continued existence of the authoritarian elites in institutions. These authors further
articulate this argument regarding the decreased likelihood of punishment of dictators when the

2

Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996): 107.
Daniel Mazzei, 11.
4
Daniel Mazzei, 11; David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Tipping the Civil-Military Balance: Institutions and
Human Rights Policy in Democratic Argentina and Chile,” Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 5 (October 1,
1998): 636, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414098031005004; Carlos H Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, “Adjusting the
Armed Forces to Democracy: Successes, Failures, and Ambiguities in the Southern Cone,” in Constructing
Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America, ed. Elizabth Jelin and Eric Hershberg
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 33.
3
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new government inherits constitutions from the prior regime: “once a constitution is
promulgated, the commitment to former elites’ interests can be ensured through several
channels: over-representing holdover elites in political institutions, inducing political gridlock,
imposing military veto power over policy, and enshrining elite dominance over local politics.”5
This effectively prevents the former dictatorial elites from prosecution and enshrines their power
in the new democracy, making any meaningful change to the system more difficult.
Additionally, the role of the military in the new democracy greatly depends on the
etiology and modality of the transition. Carlos Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz address the direct
effect of the relative success of the military regime during the dictatorship and its role after: “the
process of political struggle that took place before, during, and after the dictatorship determined
the way in which the Armed Forces were eventually integrated into the democratic system.”6
Furthermore, Charles Call discovers a deeper connection between the mode of transition and the
internal security reforms that result. Armed forces have many incentives to remain in power such
as to block prosecutions of its members, avoid loss of access to bribes and illicit incomes, and to
defend itself from perceived internal threats, however; their ability to do so depends on whether
or not the country experienced a “war transition”—a “democratic transitions where the armed
forces are strategically defeated by an enemy army or forced to negotiate an end to war.”7 Call
argues for the weakening of the military as a necessary condition to introduce the broadest
reforms to security, which most frequently occur after a war transition.8 This argument enforces

5

Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, “Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of
Outgoing Autocrats,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2014): 551, 552,
https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12128.
6
Carlos H Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, 1996, 33.
7
Charles Call, “War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 35
(November 1, 2002): 1, https://doi.org/10.2307/4146925.
8
Charles Call, 1, 21.
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the transition literature as it emphasizes the complicated and negative effect of a persistent
military presence after the dictatorship ends without transition by collapse.
Further, David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux articulate another way to analyze the
effects of the different modes of transition. They believe a complete understanding of the
transitions and the governments’ responses cannot exist without analyzing the institutional
arrangements that remain. The relative concentration of decision-making authority combined
with the relative autonomy of decision-makers from opposition pressure will determine the
success of the justice programs. The higher the concentration of decision-making authority—“the
number of actors/units involved in formulating and implementing policy”—the more a singleactor can impose his or her preferences, specifically regarding transitional justice policies, and
the less likely a manipulative opportunity arises for the military to counteract such efforts,
meaning the decision-maker can avert the negative effects of decentralized power.9 Decisionmaking autonomy refers to “an institution’s capacity to act independently by insulating itself
from unwanted, external pressures,” specifically from the armed forces.10 An institution with
autonomy can more easily protect itself from military opponents. Figure 1 demonstrates the
matrix through which Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux analyze the relative authority and autonomy to
determine the success of policies and effectiveness of military intervention.

9

David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, 640.
David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, 640.

10
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Figure 1: Policy outcomes and institutional design (Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux)

Moreover, power-balance theory expands on the type of transition distinction and its
effect on prosecutions. This theory determines the occurrence—and success—of trials as a result
of the “balance of power that exists between the old and new elites immediately after a
transition.”11 Accordingly, the theory proposes that transitions with a pact will have less success
than those that collapsed—and even less than regimes ousted by force—as a result of the change
in and level of coerciveness of the new government, diminished strength of previously powerful
elites, removal of the past-regime from dominance, acceptance of accountability by the new
government, and the ability to make substantial alterations to the country.12 In a 2012 study, Hun
Joon Kim finds that the power balance between old and new elites does not generally affect a

11
Hun Joon Kim, “Structural Determinants of Human Rights Prosecutions after Democratic Transition,” Journal of
Peace Research 49, no. 2 (March 1, 2012): 307, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311431600.
12
Carlos Santiago Nino, 118, 119; Daniel Mazzei, 13; Hun Joon Kim, 307; Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim,
“The Justice Cascade: The Origins and Effectiveness of Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations,” Annual Review
of Law and Social Science 9, no. 1 (2013): 277, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102612-133956.
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state’s decision to prosecute human rights trials; however, he discovered that countries that
experienced a transition by collapse were 2.4 times more likely to use prosecutions, only in the
first four years after the transition, than countries that did not face a ruptured transition.13

Democracy
The term “transition to democracy” emphasizes the end goal: democracy. Manfred
Schmidt accurately states “‘Democracy’ is the collective term for a wide variety of regimes,”
meaning many definitions and typographies exist.14 Abraham Lincoln’s famous definition of
democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” can only begin to
define this term.
Scholar Robert Dahl considers the defining feature of a democracy as “the quality of
being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens,” whom he considers as
political equals.15 Therefore, its citizens must have the uninhibited ability to “1) formulate their
preferences, 2) signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual
and collective action, and 3) have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the
government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the
preference.”16 Table 1 defines the institutional guarantees that Dahl articulates that align with the
three opportunities.

13

Hun Joon Kim, 312.
Manfred G. Schmidt, “Political Performance and Types of Democracy: Findings from Comparative Studies,”
European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 1 (2002): 147, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00007.
15
Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale University Press, 1973): 2.
16
Robert Alan Dahl, 2.
14
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Table 1: Some Requirements for a Democracy among a Large Number of People (Dahl)

For the opportunity to:
I. Formulate preferences

II. Signify preferences

III. Have preferences weighted equally in
conduct of government

The following institutional guarantees are
required:
1. Freedom to form and join organizations
2. Freedom of expression
3. Right to vote
4. Right of political leaders to compete for
support
5. Alternative sources of information
1. Freedom to form and join organizations
2. Freedom of expression
3. Right to vote
4. Eligibility for public office
5. Right of political leaders to compete for
support
6. Alternative sources of information
7. Free and fair elections
1. Freedom to form and join organizations
2. Freedom of expression
3. Right to vote
4. Eligibility for public office
5. Right of political leaders to compete for
support
a. Right of political leaders to
compete for votes
6. Alternative sources of information
7. Free and fair elections
8. Institutions for making government
policies depend on votes and other
expressions of preference

Using these indicators, Dahl categorizes regimes using two dimensions: public contestation and
inclusiveness (or electoral participation), see Figure 2. Dahl describes an exclusive regime with
little opportunity for contestation as a closed hegemony.17 Should a regime liberalize and move
along path one to more contestation, it becomes a competitive oligarchy whereas moving along

17

Robert Alan Dahl, 7.
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path two increases the popularization of the regime and develops into an inclusive hegemony.18
According to Dahl, a regime becomes closest to a democracy with full inclusiveness and full
public contestation; however, he uses the term “polyarchy” to avoid over-generalizing as he
understands other factors contribute to this democratic designation.19 This categorization of
democracy by Dahl forms the basis of many other definitions as it outlines democratic norms and
how to evaluate them.

Figure 2: Liberalization, Inclusiveness, and Democratization (Dahl)

Other scholars have based their definitions of democracy on that of Dahl. Mike Alvarez,
et al. take a minimalist approach in defining democracy: “a regime in which some governmental
offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections.”20 Contestation implies that the
opposition has some chance of winning office in an election and has three features: 1) ex ante
uncertainty—some positive probability that at least one incumbent can lose in an election cycle,
2) ex post irreversibility—the winner of an election will assume office, and 3) repeatability.21
Alvarez et al. define a regime as a democracy if the people elect the chief executive and the

18

Robert Alan Dahl, 7.
Robert Alan Dahl, 8.
20
Mike Alvarez et al., “Classifying Political Regimes,” Studies In Comparative International Development 31, no. 2
(June 1996): 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02719326.
21
Mike Alvarez et al., 5-6.
19
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legislature and if more than one party exists.22 Further, Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán
pose a narrower yet still minimalist definition of democracy: “a regime (1) that sponsors free and
fair competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (2) that allows for inclusive adult
citizenship; (3) that protects civil liberties and political rights; and (4) in which the elected
governments really govern and the military is under civilian control.”23 This definition of
democracy aligns more so with Dahl because it requires more of a regime to not only have
political contestation but also provide certain rights and be free of military pressure. Acuña and
Smulovitz pose a third definition using an intermediate approach evaluating “the degree and
scope (maintenance/variation) of military prerogatives” and “the degree and level of military
contestation of civilian decisions,” categorizing regimes as democratic if they have low or
middle levels of military prerogatives and low levels of military contestation.24 This definition
approaches democracy more so in terms of the presence, or lack thereof, of the military, a
different yet related approach to that of Dahl.
Arend Lijphart thus defines democracy using the words of Abraham Lincoln as
“government by the people or, in representative democracy, government by the representatives
of the people” and “government in accordance with the people’s preferences.”25 Using this
definition he articulates two distinct types of democracy that answer the pivotal questions, “Who
will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be responsive when the
people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?”26 The first type titled the

22

Mike Alvarez et al., 7-8.
Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America 19451999,” Studies in Comparative International Development 36, no. 1 (March 2001): 38,
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02687584.
24
Carlos H Acuña and Catalina Smulovitz, 34.
25
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Second
Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012): 1.
26
Arend Lijphart, 2.
23
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Westminster or majoritarian model answers this question promoting the majority’s wishes while
the consensus model, his second category, advocates for as many people as possible.27 Lijphart
differentiates the two types on a basis of 10 indicators. Table 2 demonstrates the differences
between the majoritarian and consensus democracies.
Table 2: Classifications of the Majoritarian/Westminster and Consensus Models of Democracy (Lijphart)

Majoritarian/ Westminster
High concentration of executive power in
one-party and bare-majority cabinets
Cabinet dominance
Two-party system
Majoritarian and disproportional system of
elections
Interest group pluralism
Unitary and centralized government
Concentration of legislative power in a
unicameral legislature
Constitutional flexibility
Absence of judicial review
Central bank controlled by the executive

Consensus
Executive power-sharing in broad coalition
cabinets
Executive-legislative balance of power
Multiparty system
Proportional representation
Interest group corporatism
Federal and decentralized government
Strong bicameralism
Constitutional rigidity
Judicial review
Central bank independence

Scholars have debated the efficacy and strength of the comparative regimes for decades.
Before World War II, scholars viewed majoritarian democracies “as more stable, fitter for
survival even under adverse circumstances…, and better at problem solving;” however, this
belief has switched in the 1970s with more arguing for the comparative strength of consensus
democracies, specifically in “softer” political issues.28
Many scholars have extrapolated on the majoritarian-consensus typography and applied it
to specific regions or circumstances, including Kestler et al. who operationalize the distinction in
Latin America. Using five of the 10 measures—party systems, concentration of executive power,

27
28

Arend Lijphart, 2.
Manfred G. Schmidt, 148–49.
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executive-legislative relations, electoral systems and interest groups—the authors evaluate the
practices in 10 Latin American countries to determine the type of democracy. They discover less
stability in institutional patterns in their sample than Lijphart’s original findings, which they
contribute to the impact of informal institutions due to increased clientelism. Including
informality into the analyses, Kestler et al. find that countries have progressively adopted more
majoritarian patterns.29
Despite some differences, all of the definitions above imply a representative democracy.
O’Donnell defines another type of democracy—delegative democracies—as those who fit Dahl’s
criteria for a polyarchy and have persisted however have not secured themselves as
representative democracies as a result of “neither institutional progress nor much governmental
effectiveness in dealing with their respective social and economic crises.”30 Representative
democracies have engrained institutions that “provide a crucial level of mediation and
aggregation between, on one side, structural factors and, on the other, not only individuals but
also the diverse groupings under which society organizes its multiple interests and identities”
whereas delegative democracies “rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the
presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of
existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office.”31 In other words, a
representative democracy has certain institutional parameters that have developed over time that
do not yet exist in a delegative democracy. O’Donnell describes delegative democracies as
“strongly” majoritarian and individualistic however with “weak institutionalization and, at best,

29

Thomas Kestler, Juan Bautista Lucca, and Silvana Krause, “‘Break-In Parties’ and Changing Patterns of
Democracy in Latin America,” Brazilian Political Science Review 10, no. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1590/198138212016000100004.
30
Guillermo A O’Donell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994): 56,
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1994.0010.
31
Guillermo A O’Donell, 59.
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is indifferent toward strengthening it.”32 This new categorization of democracy tends to emerge
after transitions, which O’Donnell found in Latin America and other post-communist, Asian, and
African countries.
Another classification for democracy depends on the selection manner of the executive
and legislative and how the two bodies interact to form policy. Parliamentarism and
presidentialism represent the two main classifications. In a parliamentary system, the executive
“is selected by the assembly” and “remains in office subject to legislative confidence” whereas
the “chief executive is popularly elected; the terms of the chief executive and of the assembly are
fixed, and not subject to mutual confidence; [and] the elected executive names and directs the
composition of the government and has some constitutionally granted lawmaking authority” in a
presidential system.33 John Carey states that the root of distinction between the two system
predicates on the origin and survival of these two branches: parliamentarism usually results in
fused powers where the executive and assembly have power to dissolve the other based on
mutual dependence while the two branches under presidentialism have distinct electoral
processes.34 Carey defines hybrid regimes as the third category where “the president is popularly
elected, and is endowed with meaningful powers [and] there also exists a prime minister and
cabinet, subject to assembly confidence.”35 Hybrid regimes can exist along a spectrum between
presidentialism and parliamentarism.
Many scholars have evaluated and compared the two dominant systems attempting to
determine which regime type has most success and, within the context of the plethora of newly

32

Guillermo A O’Donell, 60, 62.
John M. Carey, “Presidential versus Parliamentary Government,” in Handbook of New Institutional Economics,
ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 91.
34
John M. Carey, 92.
35
John M. Carey, 92.
33
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democratic states in the 1980s and 1990s, has less risk of breakdown. Scholars, namely Juan
Linz, argued that parliamentarism provides democratic stability in ways not present in
presidentialism as well as advocated for the democratic norms such as voter participation and
protection of minorities.36 However, the actions of the newly democratic regimes in Latin
America and around the world do not fully represent the scholars’ optimistic view of
parliamentarism. According to Carey, a majority of the countries maintained a powerfully,
elected president; however, they granted assemblies with substantial confidence authority over
some part of the executive.37 The distinction of parliamentarism and presidentialism then
possibly affects the longevity of democracy.
Furthermore, Manuel Garretón discusses ways to approach democratic consolidation. He
argues that a state must address the authoritarian enclaves in order to complete its transition. The
new regimes inherit four enclaves from its dictatorial predecessors: 1) human rights violations;
2) an institutional legacy of democratic norms that limit democratic practices; 3) political actors,
organizations, and social sectors linked to the military; and 4) a generalized presence of
antidemocratic or authoritarian values, mentalities, and attitudes.38 Therefore, the governments
must determine an approach to treat these authoritarian enclaves comprehensively in order to
develop into a democratic regime. Garretón outlines two logics that regimes can adopt to address
these issues: 1) ethical-symbolic logic, which advocates for the reconstitution of the situation that
existed prior and demands truth, the dissemination of information about the crimes, trials and
punishments of those responsible, and reparations for the victims and 2) politico-statist logic

36

John M. Carey, 94; Manfred G. Schmidt, 154.
John M. Carey, 97.
38
Manuel Antonio Garretón, “Human Rights in Democratization Processes,” in Constructing Democracy: Human
Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America, ed. Elizabth Jelin and Eric Hershberg (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1996), 40.
37
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which searches for the maintenance of a democratic regime that inherently resolves the human
rights issue and prevents similar ones in the future.39 Following the multiple definitions of
democracy and its types, Garretón proposes that states must first repair themselves from the
effects of the dictatorial regimes before reaching democracy status.

Transitional Justice
Another definition necessary to evaluate the differences between the two countries’
responses relates to the study of transitional justice. The use of “transition to democracy” to
describe the ending of an authoritarian regime as opposed to “regime change” or “transfers of
power” emphasizes the stated goal of democratic reform; the end of modernization theories that
heavily focused on socioeconomic conditions; a reformation of the formerly Marxist term
“transition” once connoting social reform to a focus on political reform; and a decline of the
radical Left in favor of increased human rights norms.40 This term also expresses its goal of
“some measure of justice for victims of state crimes.”41 Transitional justice has become a widely
popular field of study regarding the process of consolidating democracy after authoritarianism,
especially during the third wave of democratization. Accordingly, Paul van Zyl, the Executive
Secretary of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, declared transitional justice
“an attempt to build a sustainable peace after conflict, mass violence, or systemic human rights
abuse,”42 and José Zalaquett, a prominent human rights lawyer and former adviser to Chilean
President Patricio Aylwin, emphasized the need of transitional justice to put the “existing moral
39

Manuel Antonio Garretón, 41.
Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,”
Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 337-340, https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0069.
41
Melissa Nobles, “The Prosecution of Human Rights Violations,” Annual Review of Political Science 13, no. 1
(2010): 166, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.040108.110013.
42
Paul van Zyl, “Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies,” in Transitional Justice: Handbook for
Latin America, ed. Félix Reátegui (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2011), 45.
40
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order…back in place.”43 While scholars contemplate the origins of transitional justice, most
agree on the definition as measures undertaken by emerging democracies.44 Accordingly,
transitional justice serves two main purposes: “to respond to the experiences of suffering of the
past; and to prevent similar suffering in the future” through prosecutions, reparations,
reformations to institutions, truth, and reconciliation.45 This large field has subsections within
that address its goals and effects, specifically the importance of the rule of law, transitional
advocacy networks, diffusion theory, and the resulting justice cascade.
The rule of law presents as a long-term goal of transitional justice. It requires the
actionable limiting of government and the acknowledgment on part of the executive of the
binding nature of the law as well as implies accountability and an existing social contract. Pilar
Domingo states, “The degree of rule of law to some extent is a measure of the degree to which
states live up to the promises of the bill of rights.”46 The judiciary comprises a pivotal role in
transitional justice. Legitimate prosecutions rely on an unbiased, impartial, and fair judiciary to
arrive at the truth and determine the culpability of all those involved. Scholars have found that
judicial reforms focusing on strengthening the rule of law—specifically judicial independence
and the establishment of judicial council—have successfully swept through Latin America.

43
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The Need for Moral Reconstruction in the Wake of Past Human Rights Violations: An
Interview with José Zalaquett,” in Transitional Justice: Handbook for Latin America, ed. Félix Reátegui (New
York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2011), 164.
44
Paige Arthur, 331.
45
Paul van Zyl, 45.
Pilar Domingo, “Accountability, the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Latin America,” in After Oppression:
Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano (Tokyo,
Japan: United Nations University Press, 2012): 45.
46
Pilar Domingo, 43.
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Further, de facto judicial independence has shown to result in more respect for human rights,
specifically physical integrity rights.47
The legal status, as argued by Nino, follows as an important component of the rule of law
and transitional justice. A continuous legal status means “a new legal system emerges from the
old one, adhering to preexisting rules for the creation of new laws” whereas “democracy is
founded on an entirely new constitution with no link to the old legal system” in a ruptured
transition.48 A third possibility exists as well: restoration—“the new democracy is found on an
old constitution, once in force but suspended or abrogated by the authoritarian regime.”49
Logically, Nino emphasizes the increasing levels of difficulty for justice, with legal rupture as
the smoothest, restoration with an intermediate degree of difficulty, and the continuous transition
most difficult.50 The maintenance of certain judicial features, specifically lack of judicial
independence or existence of biased judges from the authoritarian regime inhibit democratic
progress and the ability to adequately prosecute perpetrators of human rights.
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) comprise another component of transitional
justice where individuals from domestic and international nongovernmental organizations, civil
society groups, and international organizations collaborate on specific issues to promote ideas,
norms, and policies, specifically trials. Kim’s study finds, “a state with strong domestic and
international organizations advocating human rights and individual criminal accountability is
likely to use human rights prosecutions more frequently and persistently.”51 Domestic advocacy
increases the likelihood of prosecutions by 4.3 times and international pressure increases it by
47
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2.4 times; however, when international and domestic pressures combine, he finds countries 10
times more likely to prosecute.52 Interestingly, he finds that domestic advocacy fuels high-level
prosecutions whereas international pressure largely influences low-level prosecutions.53 The
TANs also exist as the pillar of the boomerang model, outlined by Keck and Sikkink, whereby
members of a state bypass their own government and appeal to regional NGOs and TANs to
pressure their state to make the desired human rights changes.
Transitional justice also includes diffusion theory. According to Kim, “diffusion occurs
when the decision to proceed with a human rights prosecution in one country is influenced by
previous choices of other countries with an authoritarian past.”54 The diffusion could occur
simply due to geographic proximity and/or through cultural similarity. Kim finds, “a state is
more likely to initiate and repeatedly use human rights prosecutions if similar prosecutions had
already been used by its neighbors,” with more success with diffusion through cultural similarity
(four times greater) than solely geographic proximity.55 Language and religion present the most
common shared cultural factors that influence diffusion.56
Kathryn Sikkink discovered the justice cascade or the “rapid and dramatic shift in the
legitimacy of the norms of individual criminal accountability for human rights violations and an
increase in actions (such as trials) on behalf of such norms.”57 The practices and norms of
transitional justice have dramatically increased and spread globally. Kim and Sikkink describe
the spread as the “outward and upward [transmission] through horizontal diffusion from one
country to another and then via bottom-up vertical diffusion from individual countries to
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intergovernmental organizations and international NGOs.”58 The cascade relies on TANs who
“pioneered the strategies, developed the legal arguments, often recruited the plaintiffs and/or
witnesses, marshaled the evidence, and persevered through years of legal challenges” as well as
worked globally to spread the efforts and pressure the countries to change.59 Lutz and Sikkink
acknowledge that the efforts of the TANs had success as a result of the shift in norms to
understand and protect human rights, especially those against torture and disappearance and for
democratic governance.60 Many scholars argue that the justice cascade expanded as a result of
the actions in Latin America, specifically Argentina.

HYPOTHESES
This paper proposes various hypotheses based off the research of other academics in this
field of transitional justice:
1) higher levels of atrocities and abuses will be more motivating to justice and
accountability than lower levels;
2) internal and external factors that result in a transition by collapse will result in more
immediate actions for justice than factors that end in a consensus transition;
3) a country with a continuous legal structure, and therefore, closed judiciary, will have
a slower justice process than those with a ruptured or restored system with less
dictatorial influence on the judicial branch;
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4) higher levels of decision-making autonomy and authority of the president will result
in greater success of transitional justice policy outcomes than those with lower levels
of either;
5) greater levels of international pressure, stemming from transnational advocacy
networks, will incentivize domestic action more so than in cases without such
pressure; and
6) countries geographically proximate and/or culturally similar to another country with
transitional justice policies will be influenced more than those not such connected.
The severity and quantity of human rights abuses could potentially affect the search for
justice as a result of the moral contentions and emotions that arise. Nino states, “the more
heinous the human rights abuses, the more likely that the attempt to punish them will succeed.”61
This seems likely as people tend to believe murderers and torturers deserve repercussions.
Further, the higher number of people tortured or killed will directly impact the amount of people
affected and, therefore, the number of individuals searching and fighting for justice. As
Argentina and Chile had some of the worst torture practices during their respective dictatorships,
this hypothesis would explain why both countries had trials to prosecute those responsible for the
grave human rights abuses that occurred.
The second hypothesis relates to the discussion of etiology and modality analyzed by
many scholars. This paper determines that the etiology effects the modality, which influences the
responses to the human rights violations. Chile represents an example of an authoritarian regime
that ended due to endogenous factors: the 1988 plebiscite called for by Pinochet’s 1980
Constitution. This resulted in a pacted transition to democracy, meaning the military would still
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maintain a certain degree of power after leaving. Even though Pinochet lost the vote in 1988, he
remained the Commander in Chief of the Army and retained many of his political powers as
well. On the other hand, the economic crisis, the increase in number and strength of the human
rights social movements, the division within the armed forces, and the military loss in the
Falkland Islands represent the endogenous and exogenous factors that led to the Argentine
Junta’s failure. The Argentine case, therefore, represents a transition by collapse. As stated by
Carlos Santiago Nino, “The collapse of the Argentine military regime, triggered both by external
and internal factors, created in its wake a certain balance of power which was partially
determinative of the course of retroactive justice.”62 As the Junta lost its power, it did not have
the same benefits as seen by Pinochet in Chile. This paper argues that the difference in factors
that resulted in the transition and the mode itself greatly impacts the ability for justice—with
those by collapse more likely to adopt transitional justice policies— at least in the short run.
Accordingly, Argentina’s collapse made the response for justice much quicker than that of Chile.
As an effect of the type of transition, this paper suggests that the legal status also impacts
the likelihood of prosecutions. Due to the terms of the 1988 plebiscite and transitional
negotiations, the Chilean judicial system and judges remained closely tied to the Pinochet
regimes—an example of a continuous legal status. Argentina, however, presents as an example
of legal restoration. The country reinstated its original Constitution; however, policies enacted by
the authoritarian regime also remained. Article 18 of the 1853 Constitution prohibit ex post facto
criminal legislation and when combined with article 2 of the Penal Code that states that the
defendant must receive the most favorable law to them, the self-amnesty law of the dictatorship
appeared to protect the regime.63 The availability of the judicial system can, therefore, determine

62
63

Carlos Santiago Nino, 108.
Carlos Santiago Nino, -21.

Drucker 25
the judicial system as a path for transitional justice. As the judicial system in Chile remained
heavily influence by Pinochet influence beginning years of the transition, prosecutions had a
considerably smaller chance of success than in Argentina.
Similarly, the availability of institutions remains important to enact transitional justice
policies. Following the argument of Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, an executive with high decisionmaking autonomy and a high concentration of authority will have a greater opportunity to
promote such policies. According to the authors, Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina, had high
decision-making autonomy but a low concentration of authority as the judiciary system had high
levels of independence, making for moderate success in Alfonsín’s policies.64 President Patricio
Aylwin of Chile had mixed success in his two part plan as he had high levels of autonomy and
authority for his first phase of an inquest into the abuses but for his second phase of naming the
abuses, he relied on the judiciary and Congress who still had strong ties to Pinochet.65 This paper
indicates that the autonomy and authority of the executive hold importance for the success of
justice policies.
International pressure greatly influences the actions of states. Many scholars emphasize
the role of TANs in incentivizing prosecutions of human rights abusers. This paper argues that
international organizations and their actions, specifically those of TANs, will influence the
specified states to act in favor of transitional justice policies. The paper further assumes the
importance of nationals abroad in truth bearing and motivating TANs to pressure the states.
Specifically, the acts of Spain and England forced Chile to evaluate their actions, or lack thereof,
regarding transitional justice and criminal trials. Further, the protests in London and Chilean

64
65

David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, 651.
David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, 656.

Drucker 26
communities abroad collaborated to bring awareness of the demands and desires for justice that
the Chilean government could no longer ignore.66
Lastly, this paper considers the diffusion theory as highly motivational for transitional
countries to pursue criminal trials. As stated above, Kim discovered that countries geographically
close and culturally similar will be influenced by the actions of other states. Latin America, a
largely Spanish-speaking and Catholic region, would therefore seem the most likely region to
have trials as a result of diffusion. As the two case study countries share geographical proximity
as well as similar language, religion, and culture, this paper assumes a connection. With the
Chilean process occurring after the Argentine, this paper considers the diffusion theory and the
effect that the trials in Argentina had on the latter case.
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METHODS
“Everything I did, all my actions, all of the problems I had I dedicate to God and to Chile,
because I kept Chile from becoming Communist.”
(Augusto Pinochet, Former Dictator of Chile)
This thesis utilizes a comparative case study analysis of two countries—Argentina and
Chile—with many similarities yet startling differences to understand on a broader level what
results in differing responses to the human rights violations that occur during dictatorships.
Following the hypotheses set forth earlier in the essay, the analysis will focus on certain
variables that operationalize the premises and allow for the requisite comprehensive analysis.
First, the paper must articulate the periods of dictatorship, transition to democracy, and
resulting government. Many data projects have analyzed periods of democracy and
authoritarianism. Freedom House classifies countries as free, partly free, or not free depending
on the presence and degree of political rights and civil liberties.67 The Polity IV Project analyzes
democracy and autocracy to create a polity score. Polity IV has a three-part definition for
institutionalized democracy: 1) “the presence of institutions and procedures through which
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders,” 2) “the
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive,” and 3) “the
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political
participation.”68 Countries receive a score from 0 (no democracy) to 10 (democracy). Similarly,
autocracy, the “restrict[ion] or suppress[ion of] competitive political participation,” has a 0 (not
autocratic) to 10 (autocratic) range. The Polity2 score combines these two variables to determine

67
Freedom in the World, “Country and Territory Ratings and Statuses, 1973-2019” (Freedom House, 2019),
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.
68
Monty Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 18002018,” Polity IV Project (Center for Systemic Peace, 2019), http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.

Drucker 28
the level of autocracy or democracy in a given country, ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to
10 (strongly democratic). Additionally, the Democracy and Dictatorship dataset defines
democracy as the presence of certain variables such as effective executive and legislative
elections, a closed legislature, and the legality and presence of multiple parties.69 If a country
receives certain scores on these measures, they classify the country as a democracy. The
Transitional Justice Research Collaborative (TJRC) also codified countries as democratic or
autocratic.
Further, many of the hypotheses consider the amount of justice; therefore, this paper must
operationalize this term. This thesis considers justice as the presence of human rights trials,
especially considering both studied countries had at least one truth and reconciliation
commission. Country reports publicize data on prosecutions, which this paper will consider.
Also, the TJRC measured prosecutions and verdicts of the countries and regions as well as guilty
verdicts. The first TJRC variable measures the number of prosecutions in a given year while
another adds the prosecutions of previous years to arrive at a lagged sum. A lagged sum also
exists for the number of guilty verdicts. This paper will analyze the data from TJRC to determine
as well as the information from the country reports to measure the degree of justice in each
country over time.
The first hypothesis discusses the heinousness of human rights violations. The
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project examined such information, evaluating
countries’ behaviors regarding extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and political
imprisonment, culminating in an overall physical integrity rights index.70 According to the
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prevalence of such actions, countries receive a 0 for the frequent practice (50 or more), 1 for
occasional practice (1-49), and 2 for no practice or unreported.71 The physical integrity rights
index combines the scores of these four indicators and scores countries from 0 (no government
respect) to 8 (full government respect).72 Keith Schnakenberg and Christopher J. Fariss created
another system—Latent Human Rights Protection—to evaluate respect for human rights,
especially physical integrity rights. These scores represent standard deviations from zero (5.4 to 3.8), with the higher numbers signifying more protections for these rights. The Political Terror
Scale (PTS) codifies information from human rights reports from Amnesty International, the
U.S. State Department, and Human Rights Watch and analyzes such data based on a 5-level
terror scale from 1, which means “torture is rare or exceptional,” to 5, which signifies that “terror
has expanded to the whole population”—a score of 0 means data not available.73 Further, this
thesis will also examine the reports issued regarding such topics, including Nunca Más (Never
Again), the Rettig Report, and the Valech Report.
The second hypothesis relies on the history of the countries, examining the internal and
external factors that led to the transition. This paper trusts scholarly analysis of such
unquantifiable actions.
Next, the third hypothesis analyzes the legal/judicial structure of the country. This
requires an analysis of the availability of the legal system to trials of perpetrators from the prior
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dictatorship. Therefore, the paper will evaluate measures of judicial independence to determine
the accessibility of the judicial system. CIRI codes states in terms of the “extent to which the
judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government
or military”: 0= not independent, 1=partially independent, and 2=generally independent.74
Another measure of judicial independence comes from Linda Camp Keith and scores countries
identically to CIRI’s dataset. 75 Drew A. Linzer and Jeffrey K. Stanton have another dataset that
measures de facto judicial independence, which scores countries from 0 to 1, with 1 representing
higher levels of judicial independence.76
The next hypothesis compares the autonomy and authority of the president to gauge the
ability to execute transitional justice policies. This hypothesis builds on the prior one, as the
structure and independence of the judiciary will impact that of the executive. Further, this paper
will analyze the executive constraints measure of the Polity IV dataset. This measure “refers to
the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives.”77
“Accountability groups”—advisors in monarchies, the military, an independent judiciary—may
impose such limitations on the executive. The score ranges from 1—unlimited authority—to 7—
executive parity or subordination.78 This score, however, does not articulate the type of
accountability group, meaning the score cannot explain the pressures facing the executive. For
example, the legacy of a dictator in the legislative or judiciary does not differ from an equally
powerful yet balanced and democratic legislature. Therefore, this paper considers the types of
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groups exerting constraints and whether or not these constraints occur organically as in a
democracy or remain from as a post-dictatorial regime.
International pressure exists in many forms; however, this paper focuses on pressure from
individuals and transnational advocacy networks. Exiles from Argentina and Chile formed strong
groups that actively opposed the dictatorships and demanded justice. Further, the efforts of the
Spanish government and judicial system to prosecute Pinochet using universal jurisdiction
contributes to the international pressure studied in this paper. This thesis also analyzes reports
from international organizations. These organizations such as the United Nations (General
Assembly, Security Council, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights),
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights work with smaller non-profit organizations and non-governmental organizations as part of
TANs. Reports and resolutions by these international organizations will emphasize the degree of
the presence of TANs and their responses to the actions of the dictatorships and civilian
governments.
The last hypothesis following diffusion theory relies on statistical information of
transitional justice policies enacted in geographically proximate or culturally similar countries.
As mentioned throughout this thesis, Argentina and Chile—neighbors in South America—have
many cultural similarities and as Argentina transitioned before Chile, my last hypothesis would
posit that Argentina influenced Chile if the former had trials and prosecutions. Along with the
prosecutions data from TJRC, the Collaborative also recorded the percentage of countries in a
region that experienced prosecutions in a given year. This paper will use the data compiled by
the TJRC and other in-state reports to evaluate the existence of prosecutions and guilty verdicts
to determine the validity of the diffusion theory.
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CASES
Many countries have undergone transitions to democracy in the late 20th and early 21st
centuries, meaning many possible examples exist to examine the question proposed in this thesis.
However, this paper will compare and contrast Argentina and Chile. The many cultural,
historical, and geographical similarities of these two countries allow for a specified analysis of
the post-dictatorial governments’ responses and, therefore, make strong case studies.
Argentina and Chile belong to the same geographical region of the Southern Cone. These
countries also share similar cultural practices and historical roots. Further, all of the Southern
Cone countries suffered coup d’états by military groups around the 1970s, resulting in
devastating institutional military dictatorships. Among the entire region, the dictators believed in
the Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional (DSN)—Doctrine of National Security—which articulated a
fight against the threat of communism and defined the “ideological frontiers” and “internal
enemy” to which the dictatorships must fight against to protect their countries.79 This common
construction and ideology among all of the dictators aligned with that of the United States. The
United States played a large role in instituting and maintaining the dictatorships in the Southern
Cone, especially within the Cold War context that cemented the anti-communist directive.
The overlap in timing and interests intersects with the Plan Condor that unified the
dictatorial regimes of the region. The Chilean secret police, the Dirección de Inteligencia
Nacional—Directorate of National Intelligence—(DINA), spearheaded the effort to collaborate
with the other military powers in the region as well as the United States to share information
about insurgent individuals and groups, facilitate the capture of political prisoners who had
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escaped their countries of origin to neighboring countries, and organize operations against the
political enemies.80 Plan Condor ensured similar actions be taken by all regimes, contributing to
the mass human rights violations that occurred throughout the region.
Despite all of these similarities between Argentina and Chile, they had a variety of
differences as well. The Argentine regime named itself the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional
(Proceso)—Process of National Reorganization—which lasted from 1976 to 1983 and had four
presidents: General Jorge Rafael Videla (1976-1980), General Roberto Eduardo Viola (19801981), General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri (1981-1982) and General Reynaldo Bignone (19821983). On the other hand, General Augusto Pinochet had control over Chile from the coup d’état
on September 11, 1973 until the end in 1990. Further, scholars have found that the Argentine
economy collapsed while the Chilean economy thrived under the Chicago Boys’ libertarian
policies. This influenced public attitudes toward the regimes which impacted the relative success
and permanence of the dictators. The details and timelines of each country will help in the
understanding of the actions of each country during their transitions to democracy and in the
years that followed as well as provide the basis for the data analysis in the following chapter.

Argentina
On March 24, 1976, the armed forces overthrew the democratic government of María
Estela Martínez de Perón, beginning the reign of the Military Junta. The armed forces in
Argentina had decided to share the power, granting each of the three sectors—army, navy, and
air force—equal control and different responsibilities. This division attempted to appease any
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potential intra-military conflict.81 Aligning with the DNS, the Junta relied on inflicting fear and
terror into the country and had decided that “repression of terrorism was to be clandestine.”82
Each sector of the armed forces had assigned its own groups of individuals in charge of the
torture centers with full autonomy to “detain, torture, and decide the destiny of the prisoners.”83
State-run terrorism dominated the country as countless individuals suffered torture in secret,
defining the first phase of the Argentine dictatorship of “violently subordinat[ing] society to state
control.”84
El Proceso also implemented a new neoliberal economic system, similar to that of the
Chicago Boys in Chile. This shift along with other attempts to solidify their political standing in
the country and the world represent the second phase of the Junta as articulated by Acuña and
Smulovitz, “to craft the future political order.”85 The year 1979, however, greatly debilitated the
regime. First, the economy started to collapse with a large external debt, a falling investment
rate, a recession, and rising inflation rates.86 Then, a visit by the Comisión Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos (CIDH)—Interamerican Commission on Human Rights—questioned the
validity of the Junta in its revealing report. Videla attempted to use this visit to construct a
narrative that the repression used by the Junta targeted the threats to the country; however, the
report criticized the regime and articulated to the national and international communities some of
the realities in the country at that time. “The report ended up legitimizing both internally and
externally the claims of the human rights organizations,” adding to the momentum of many
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human rights organizations in the country, namely the Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo—
Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo—and the Asamblea Permanente por los
Derechos Humanos—Permanent Assembly for Human Rights.87 As the human rights
organizations gained strength and power and the economy continued to deteriorate, the tensions
within the armed forces rose. General Viola replaced General Videla in 1980 as an attempt to
stabilize the regime; however, this endeavor failed, and a palace coup resulted in General Galtieri
assuming power. The search for stability articulated the intra-military tensions and presented as a
warning sign for impending struggles.
On April 2, 1982, the Military Junta waged a war against the United Kingdom to
recuperate the Falkland Islands from British control. A long-standing controversy between
Argentina and the United Kingdom revolve around the ownership of the islands, as the
Argentines believe that they should control the land. The original intent of the Junta “was a
symbolic demonstration” in an attempt to unify the country and regain their power around a
state-wide belief of the Argentine right to the Falkland Islands; instead, Argentina suffered a
tremendous loss within a 73-day period.88 However, the defeat on the Falkland Islands created an
opportunity for the country to question the regime.89 The Falkland Islands War, therefore, “can
be considered as the beginning of the end of the dictatorship” as “Falklands was the tragic
extreme to which [the people] were dragged after long periods in which death had become
almost a habit."90 This loss invigorated the people to question the regime and fight against it.
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Further, the regime had lost so much of its power, it no longer had the ability to negotiate an
exit—the political parties did not want to collaborate with a collapsing regime.91 After the
tremendous loss in the Falkland Islands, the Junta found itself completely debilitated and
recognized a need to protect itself as the end of their reign approached.
The Proceso began to enact decrees and laws with the aim of self-preservation in the
uncertain future. The first act occurred on April 28, 1983 when the Junta published the
Documento Final de la Junta Militar sobre la Guerra contra la Subversión y el Terrorismo
(Documento Final)—Final Document of the Military Junta on the War against Subversion and
Terrorism —and the Acta Institucional—Institutional Act. These documents defended the
Junta’s actions as necessary to fight against the “rural guerilla” as well as stated that “many of
the disappearances are a consequence of the way the terrorists operated.”92 The Final Document
acted as a final opportunity for the Junta to advocate for the legitimacy of their government. The
Institutional Act had a similar objective: “All operations against subversion and terrorism carried
out by the security, police, and prison forces…were carried out in accordance with plans
approved and supervised by the high-level organic officers of the Armed Forces and by the
Board Military from the time of its constitution.”93 These documents emphasized the obligation
of such actions as part of military service and, therefore, those individuals could not face
punishment. These first actions of the Junta clarified its goal of redeeming itself, describing its
actions as favorable and aligned with anti-communist motives, and avoiding future
condemnations.

91

Ines Nercesian, Personal Interview, May 8, 2019; Carlos Santiago Nino, 61.
Junta Militar, “Documento Final de La Junta Militar Sobre La Guerra Contra La Subversión y El Terrorismo”
(Fuerzas Armadas, April 28, 1983).
93
Junta Militar, “Acta Institucional de La Junta Militar” (Junta Militar, April 28, 1983).
92

Drucker 37
A couple months after the Final Document and Institutional Act and before the October
1983 elections, the Junta published Law N22.924 or the Ley de Pacificación Nacional—Law of
National Pacification or Self-Amnesty Law—which “granted immunity to suspects of acts of
state terrorism, as well as to all members of the Armed Forces, for crimes committed between
May 25, 1973 and June 17, 1982.”94 This effort by the Junta presented a last attempt to assure a
future without trials and judgements; however, the armed forces did not all agree that this
constituted the next logical step. Some believed that they had not committed any acts requiring a
pardon while others opposed a potential amnesty for the subversives.95 Therefore, the first article
guarantees immunity for acts taken by the armed forces while the second and third exclude the
members of “illicit terrorist or subversive associations.”96 These final three actions of the Junta
demonstrate their desired legacy of a respected military regime protecting the country by any and
all means necessary against communist subversives and, therefore, should not face punishment.
Without any other options, Argentina had its first democratic presidential elections after
the Junta’s reign on October 30, 1983. Raúl Alfonsín, the Radical Party candidate won with 52%
of the votes. Throughout his campaign, Alfonsín advocated for human rights issues and the need
to try the perpetrators of the violations that had just occurred. He created and identified three
categories of perpetrators: “those who planned the repression and gave the accompanying orders;
those who acted beyond the scope of the orders, moved by cruelty, perversity, or greed; and
those who strictly complied with the orders.”97 His outspoken belief in human rights and his
willingness to take action helped secure his win. However, once in office, Alfonsín had to
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balance the sanctioning of members of the armed forces who had committed the crimes and the
incorporation of the military into the new government.98
The newly democratic government believed in the importance of trials to “reestablish the
credibility of the Argentine state and consolidate democratic institutions” as “some form of
accountability was necessary, not only from a human rights standpoint, but also to affirm the
core tenets of liberal democracy.”99 Alfonsín began an “unrestrained search for the whereabouts
of those who disappeared,” which took the form of the creation of the Comisión Nacional sobre
la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP)— National Commission on Disappeared Persons.100
CONADEP investigated the whereabouts of the thousands of disappeared persons and published
its report Nunca Más—Never Again—in 1984. The report detailed “the general process by which
the military deprived civilians of their human rights: abduction, detention in clandestine centers,
torture, and, in many cases, murder” and approximated 8,960 unaccounted for persons.101 This
number has since been raised to 30,000.
Alfonsín also articulated three principles regarding punishment: “1) Both state and
subversive terrorism should be punished. 2) There must be limits on those held responsible, for it
would be impossible effectively to pursue all those who had committed crimes. 3) The trials
should be limited to a finite period during which public enthusiasm for such a program remained
high.”102 These principles largely influenced Alfonsín’s actions.
In December 1983, Alfonsín published Decrees 157/83 and 158/83, called la teoría de los
dos demonios—the theory of the two demons—which allowed for the prosecution of military
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officials and guerilla members. By condemning both the military and the guerilla, he attempted
to appease all sides, showing no favoritism or targeting. Decree 157 ordered the arrest and
prosecution of seven guerillas including Mario Eduardo Firmenich, Fernando Vaca Marvaja,
Roberto Cirilo Perdía, and Enrique Heraldo Gorriarán Merlo while Decree 158 called for the
arrest of Lieutenant General Jorge. R. Videla, Brigadier General Orlando R. Agosti, Admiral
Emilio A. Massera, Lieutenant General Roberto E. Viola, Brigadier General Omar D. R.
Graffigna, Admiral Armando J. Lambruschini, Lieutenant General Leopoldo F. Galtieri,
Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo and Admiral Jorge I. Anaya.103 He also sanctioned Law
N23.040, which repealed the Self-Amnesty Law. Law N23.040 states annulment of law N22.924
and emphasizes that the self-amnesty law has no legal effect for the prosecution of the emerging
criminal, civil, administrative and military responsibilities of the facts which it seeks to cover.104
These decrees and law supported his first goal of punishing both state and subversive terrorists.
He also sanctioned Law N23.049 which granted modifications to the Military Justice
Code. Alfonsín had worked to reform and reconstitute the courts and had planned to use military
courts for high-ranking members of the armed forces and civil courts for those responsible for
human rights violations; however, Law 23.049 changed this plan. On February 13, 1984,
Congress passed the Reform of the Military Code which allowed military trials to appear before
civil courts upon appeal as well as articulated the first concept of due obedience, referring to the
three categories of perpetrators mentioned above.105 This law addressed his second goal of
reasonable limits of prosecutions.
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While trials for the Junta occurred in the military courts in 1983, sufficient action did not
result; therefore, on April 22, 1985, the trial of the Juntas began. On December 9, 1985, the
civilian Court of Appeals found Emilio Massera, Jorge Videla, Roberto Viola, Armando
Lambrushini and Orlando Agosti guilty. The members received varying sentences with Videla
and Massera receiving life imprisonment and permanent disqualification from holding public
office.106 These trials, however, had enormous social and political consequences. A series of
military uprisings ensued, forcing Alfonsín to promulgate two more laws. On December 24,
1986, Congress passed the Ley de Punto Final—Full Stop Law—which put a two-month limit
for filing new claims on criminal activity as outline in Law 23.049.107 This attempted to appease
the armed forces; however, the uprisings continued. A rebel group of military members, named
the carapintadas—painted faces—began rioting in the crisis de Semana Santa—Easter
Rebellion. On April 14, 1987, the carapintadas painted their faces as symbols of wartime,
origination of the name, and protested until Alfonsín met with them on April 19, Easter Sunday.
Alfonsín published the Acta de Compromiso Democrático—Act of Democratic Compromise—,
which further outlined the importance of recognizing different levels of responsibility in the
actions of the past.108 This created the path for the Ley de Obedencia Debida—Due Obedience
Law—which passed Congress on June 8, 1987. The Due Obedience Law stated that individuals
following the orders of their supervisors cannot receive punishments. These last two laws
demonstrated the efforts of Alfonsín to prosecute the armed forces and integrate them into the
new democracy. Weeks after passing the Due Obedience Law, the Supreme Court ruled the law
constitutional, finding that the Court cannot review the law of a co-equal branch of government
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“so long as the act was reasonable,” should not commandeer the legislature’s political role of
deciding appropriate measures, and the legislature has the ability to decide not to penalize certain
actions.109 However, the success of the Due Obedience Law reached its peak in the judicial
system, as politically and socially it did not assist the Radical Party in the 1987 provincial and
parliamentary elections.
In the time between the 1987 laws and the next presidential election in 1989, the
carapintadas had begun to rebel again. On January 15, 1988, a military judge ordered the
preventative imprisonment of Lieutenant Coronel Aldo Rico; however, he escaped and rebelled
against the military chief of staff, General José Dante Caridi.110 At the end of that year, Coronel
Mohammed Alí Seineldín led the carapintadas to Villa Martelli.111 While these rebellions ended
promptly and with little bloodshed, the Alfonsín government faced another attack by a leftist
group the Movimiento Todos por la Patria (MTP)—Movement of Everyone for the Country—on
January 23, 1989. The MTP took control of a military garrison in La Tablada, Buenos Aires,
which resulted in the death of 39 people, 28 of whom belonged to the group.112 This attack
tarnished the reputation of the human rights trials and, as the economy continued to spiral
downward, created an unfavorable environment for the Radical Party in the next election.
On May 14, 1989, Argentina held elections where the Peronist candidate Carlos Menem
won. The carapintadas strongly supported Menem and believed he would grant control of the
armed forces to them. On October 8, 1989, within months of assuming the title, he issued his
first presidential pardon of 277 military personnel condemned for the Falkland Islands War,
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human rights violations, and the military uprisings.113 This pardon did not include, however, the
highest members of the Junta. Although the pardon appeared to favor the carapintadas, many of
the leaders had lost their ranks and thus became disillusioned with Menem. The carapintadas
had different ways of responding to their anger, which divided them into two groups, some
aligning with Rico while others followed Seineldín. On December 3, 1990, the carapintadas
pursued the most violent uprising—21 people dead, 50 injured, and more than 30 detained—that
ultimately resulted in their defeat in the military arena.114 Weeks after the downfall of the
carapintadas and following a decrease in public support for more human rights trials, Menem
issued his second pardon this time for the former heads of the Junta including Massera, Videla,
Viola, Lambrushini, Agosti, Camps, Richieri, and Firmenich.115 The pardon also acquitted those
who had not yet been convicted of crimes and did not have any political necessity for such an
action, while those freed did not face any moral condemnation.116 After the defeat of the
carapintadas and Menem’s pardons, transitional justice policies in the country diminished,
especially as Menem inundated the judiciary with friends and members of his political party.117
The first international findings surfaced in 1992 when the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) issued Report 28/92 stating that the Due Obedience and Full Stop
Laws violated Articles 1, 8, and 25 of the American Convention, and Argentina should “clarify
the facts and identify those responsible for the human rights violations committed under the
military dictatorship;” however, Argentina did not comply with this finding or
recommendations.118 A few years later, the first international complaint filed against the
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Argentine Junta occurred on March 28, 1996 when Carlos Castresana named 38 Spanish victims
in his case in front of Baltazar Garzón in Spain.119 This case immediately grew, amassing to 300
cases in October and uniting a team of political parties, lawyers, and activists, until Garzón
issued the first international detention order against Galtieri.120 Ultimately, Garzón consolidated
the Argentine case with that of Chile shortly after Pinochet’s arrest in 1998.
Moreover, in 1994, Argentina had a constitutional convention with the original goal to
allow for presidential reelection; however, this allowed for a progressive delegation to promote
Article 75, which grants international human rights treaties and documents—Universal and
American Declarations on Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, and specific
treaties relating to torture and genocide—constitutional rank.121 This effectively states that these
treaties hold precedence over Argentine laws, even if the laws promulgated after the ratification
of the treaties.122
One year later, in 1995, Emilio Mignone and Carmen Lapacó, both parents of
disappeared daughters, petitioned the Ministry of Defense for any information regarding the
whereabouts of disappeared persons within Buenos Aires.123 The Federal Court of Appeals
initially denied their request; however Mignone and Lapacó emphasized that the path to
criminalization had closed but that did not impede their right to information and to the remains of
their loved ones.124 The Buenos Aires Appeals Court agreed and ordered the Ministry to
investigate; however, the Ministry did not adequately respond, resulting in Lapacó insisting on
the involvement of other institutions.125 The Court of Appeals then reversed their decision,
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causing Lapacó to appeal to the Supreme Court, where she ultimately lost. However, in October
1998, Lapacó and nine human rights organizations brought the case to the IACHR.126 Before the
Commission could issue a decision, the Argentine government settled with the Lapacó family in
November 1999, committing to “accept and guarantee the right to truth,” pledging the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts to determine the truth regarding the disappeared persons, and promising
to allocate a group of ad hoc prosecutors to assist in all such cases.127 During this time, truth
trials emerged, with the first in La Plata in April 1998.128
Simultaneously, Judge Marquevich, ordered the arrest of Videla in July 1998, on the
crime of child kidnapping, concealment, forgery of birth certificates, and suppression of the civil
status of a minor.129 Marquevich found the systematic baby-snatching plans as an effort to
separate families and remove them from their homes; furthermore, he determined that babysnatching and denial of identity constituted continuous crimes until the children returned to their
homes and their identities restored, meaning the amnesty laws did not apply.130 Another court
case appeared in 2000 against two known torturers—Juan Antonio del Cerro and Julio Héctor
Simón—and seven other officers for the illegal kidnapping of an eight-month-old girl, Claudia
Victoria Poblete, and the disappearances of her parents.131 Judge Gabriel Cavallo issued arrest
warrants for del Cerro and Simón on November 1, 2000, declaring it absurd to investigate what
happened to the child and not to the parents.132 Cavallo found the amnesty laws invalid and
inapplicable, declaring the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws null and void in March 2001.133
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Two years later, after the election of Nestor Kirchner, Congress declared the amnesty laws
unconstitutional and, in 2005, the Supreme Court upheld the 2001 decision, effectively
terminating the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws.134 Further, the Supreme Court found the two
pardons unconstitutional, which led to the re-arrest of many military officers.

Chile
Salvador Allende won the presidency as a Socialist candidate in 1970, with a plurality of
the vote. This presidency divided the country as the heavy anti-communist sentiment radiated
from the Cold War apprehensions. As the CIA, under the guidance of President Richard Nixon,
interfered in the affairs of Chile in the hopes of removing Allende from power, tensions mounted
among the public between Allende’s supporters and the opposition.
Nearly three years into Allende’s presidency, the military executed a coup d’état that
resulted in Allende’s death and the beginning of the military dictatorship. On that same day,
September 11, 1973, the Junta dictated its first decree which granted complete executive power
to General Augusto Pinochet and stated its mission to remove Marxism-Leninism from the
country as well as declared a state of emergency, or “state of siege,” that granted power to the
military courts and allowed for severe actions in order to combat the subversives.135 Genaro
Arriagada emphasized the ability for the Junta to commandeer the country as “the society had
become extremely polarized, and political and social hatred permeated the entire social
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fabric.”136 Chilean society had such deep ruptures that many supported the dictatorship and
believed it the solution to the problems the country faced.137
Around 3,000 people died, more than 100,000 individuals fled to exile, and countless
more filled up the prisons and concentration camps as political prisoners within the first days
following the coup.138 The once-democratic nation disintegrated into a dictatorship as “the
government dissolved the legislature, trade unions, and political parties[;] burned the voter rolls
and intervened in the universities, appointing active duty military officers as university
presidents[;] shut down the newspapers…and established censorship of the press and of
books…[and] enforced a curfew for more than a decade.”139 The month following the coup
represents some of the darkest moments during the dictatorship as the Caravana de la Muerte—
Caravan of Death—loomed over the country. The personal delegate to Pinochet, General Sergio
Arellano Stark led a mission that left at least 75 individuals dead around the country within the
first 40 days.140 Stark would fly the Puma helicopter and present himself to the commanding
officer, demanding full control over the base. While Stark enjoyed gala lunches and meetings,
his men would secretly remove prisoners—either awaiting military court or recently sentenced
for minor infractions—from jail cells and execute them, some in the desert whose bodies have
yet to appear.141 Further, Pinochet created the DINA by Decree 521, which implemented an
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organization solely beholden to him used to monitor “enemies of the state” and who often
spearheaded disappearances.142
The news of the grave human rights violations occurring in the country reached
international levels, as the United Nations decided to send a team of observers to the country in
July 1975. Pinochet originally supported this visit; however, the day before their arrival,
Pinochet reneged on his decision to allow them into the country.143 This dramatically damaged
international relations, specifically with the United States, as countries began to recognize the
use of institutionalized torture and crimes against humanity in the country, delegitimizing
Pinochet’s government.144 Relations with the United States worsened when the DINA
assassinated Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in September 1976 in Washington D.C.145
After such damaging events to Pinochet’s legitimacy, in January 1978, the country held a
plebiscite that stated, “In the face of international aggression unleashed against the government
of our country, I support President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile, and I reaffirm
the legitimate right of the Republic to conduct the process of institutionalization in a manner
befitting its sovereignty,” which unsurprisingly, Pinochet won with 80% of the vote.146 The
environment of this plebiscite did not allow for a fair voting system, as many people lived in fear
of the powers of the regime. Shortly thereafter, Pinochet administered Decree 2,191—the
amnesty law. Decree 2,191 grants amnesty “to all persons who committed criminal acts either as
perpetrators, accomplices, or accessories during the period when the state of siege was in force
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between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978,” this includes those not prosecuted or
convicted (Article 1) and those who have been (Article 2).147
Under a false guise of success after the 1978 plebiscite and the amnesty as well as a
booming economy led by the Chicago Boys, Pinochet proposed a new Constitution on
September 11, 1980—exactly seven years after the coup. The proposed Constitution, which
passed with 68% of the vote, maintained Pinochet as president and Commander-in-Chief of the
Army for the following eight years as well as the opportunity for appointment as a senator for
life after the end of his last term.148 The 1980 Constitution required a plebiscite in 1988 to
determine the future of the country. While the Constitution passed, the opposition to Pinochet,
namely the Christian Democrats and the Communist and Socialist Parties, united to denounce the
Constitution as illegitimate.149 On August 15, 1983, the unlikely allies formed the Alianza
Democrática (Democratic Alliance)—a pact among political parties—and the Asamblea de la
Civilidad (Civic Assembly)—a social agreement for civil society groups and organizations.150
The beginning of the unification caused trouble as each side had different approaches,
highlighted in the protests of 1982.151
After the passage of the Constitution, the Latin American debt crisis hit Chile as
unemployment rose and GDP fell, requiring a transition away from the Chicago Boys’ neoliberal
economy.152 Sergio Onofre Jarpa, the newly appointed Minister of the Interior, implemented the
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“politics of liberalization” which allowed important political leaders in exile to return, relaxed
press censorship, and attempted to engage with the opposition.153 With the support of
Archbishop Santiago Juan Francisco Fresno, a dialogue emerged between Jarpa, important civil
society members, and leaders of the Democratic Alliance. This created a foothold for the
opposition of the Pinochet regime, which some contend effectively “initiated the process of
transition toward democracy.”154
As the opposition began to create a strong alliance together, a “catastrophic equilibrium”
emerged with the Democratic Alliance on one side and Pinochet on the other: Pinochet
maintained his power, however, did not have the ability to destroy the opposition while the
opposition controlled the civil society but lacked the capacity to change government.155 Aylwin
contends that the mobilization of the civil society greatly affected widespread support of
Pinochet and the military regime.156 However, an assassination attempt by the Frente Patriótico
Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR)—an armed sector of the Communist Party—on Pinochet in 1986
increased repression again and decreased social mobilization.157 After the attack, the opposition
reunited abiding by a nonviolent approach. With the 1988 plebiscite widely anticipated, the
opposition decided to contest Pinochet. While the opposition would have preferred an open
election, the Democratic Alliance worked within the confines of the 1980 Constitution and,
instead, promoted the “no” vote, which would require elections as opposed to a “yes” which
would prolong the dictatorship another eight years. President Patricio Aylwin emphasized “the
one important decision was to attempt to defeat the military using its own rules of the game…We
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finally defeated Pinochet within his own institutional framework, without altering too much or
compromising what we could call peaceful coexistence among Chileans.”158 President Ricardo
Lagos underscores this sentiment: “Aylwin said that we had to accept Pinochet’s constitution in
order to change it later…Pinochet’s constitution was a fact that exists, that is enforced; so if this
is the de facto situation, then we can attempt to change that constitution without thereby
according it legitimacy.”159 As the only remaining country under military rule in the Southern
Cone, the plebiscite garnered international attention, with the U.S.-based National Democratic
Institute monitoring the voting process.160 On October 5, 1988, the NO campaign won with 56%
of the vote and allowed for an open election in the following year.

Figure 3: YES and NO Campaigns: symbol and slogan (Kurdyuk)

Despite the NO campaign winning the plebiscite, the country remained deeply divided.
Pinochet maintained national support, as he received 44% of the vote, and the respect of the
military. The concessions of the 1980 Constitution guaranteed Pinochet certain powers even after
his removal from office, specifically remaining Commander-in-Chief of the Army for eight
years—longer than the term of the first democratically elected president—and a position as
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senator for life after those years. Further, Pinochet appointed 14 of 17 Supreme Court justices to
more deeply entrench the amnesty as well as eight senators for life.161
On December 14, 1989, Chile held its first democratic elections. The Concertación de
Partidos por la Democracia (Concertación)—Coalition of Parties for Democracy—founded in
1988 from the NO campaign coalition proposed its first presidential candidate: Patricio Aylwin.
Aylwin, a Christian Democrat, received 55% of the vote, and became the first democratically
elected president after the dictatorship on March 11, 1990.
Aylwin entered power in a unique situation, one he understood as a complex balancing
act. In order to please all sides, Aylwin used the phrase, “justice to the extent possible.” Aylwin
defends such a decree:
the phrase…reflected a degree of prudence, because if justice was going to be total, if it
meant trying Pinochet and all his people, there was going to be a civil war. “To the extent
possible” was a viable course because there were trials, but not a beheading, not
aggressive actions against those who continued to have the power of arms.162
This mindset demonstrates the balancing act between finding justice for the victims of the
dictatorship as well as maintaining a path to democracy. This frame largely influenced the
actions taken by the government. The first phase of Aylwin’s presidency reflected one of
investigation into the human rights abuses.
One month after Aylwin assumed the presidency, on April 25, 1990, he issued Supreme
Decree No. 355 which created the Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación—National
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation—or the Rettig Commission to document human rights
abuses resulting in death or disappearances during the military dictatorship from September 11,
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1973 to March 11, 1990. The Decree names the eight members of the Commission, with former
Senator Raúl Rettig Guissen as the President, as well as their task and mandate. After nine
months of investigation, the Rettig Report, published February 8, 1991, documented 2,279 cases
of disappearance, killing, torture and kidnapping (641 others where the Commission lacked
consensus and 508 more outside of the mandate) largely occurring during the first three years of
the regime and spearheaded by the DINA.163 The Rettig Commission detailed the repressive
apparatus of the regime, highlighted the widespread abuses, evaluated the judiciary, and issued
recommendations such as reparations; however, the mandate did not result in judicial
consequences, include crimes such as torture or exile, nor name the perpetrators.164 The report
enraged the military, inciting a response in which the army fervently denied such actions and
contended an “unforgivable ignorance” on part of the Commission.165 Pinochet, acting as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army did not approve of the Rettig Report; however, Aylwin
subdued Pinochet and the army by emphasizing the chain of command articulated in the 1980
Constitution. This emphasized Aylwin’s power and restrained the military.166 Human rights
activists around the world also felt discouraged by the report, as they felt the Commission could
have done more.167
In the following years, Aylwin issued pardons to those still incarcerated by the Military
Courts. By January 1994 the administration had issued 135 pardons, with five more pending, and
only 12 people remaining imprisoned from the military regime.168 However, the administration
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faced difficulties continuing with its human rights agenda as the judicial and legislative systems
maintained allegiance with Pinochet. Aylwin relied on the other two branches of government to
investigate, reopen, or initiate cases as well as establish responsibility for the crimes.169 The
military remained strong after the transition to Aylwin and Pinochet’s legacy remained clear
throughout government. Aylwin attempted to reform the judicial system and the judicial branch
began to rule on such issues; however, during his time as president, the judiciary remained
infiltrated by Pinochet’s legacy. For example, in 1993, the Supreme Court issued a historic ruling
in which they found the DINA responsible for the disappearance of a Chilean citizen; however,
they also found that the amnesty applied.170
The second presidential elections occurred in 1993, with Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the
representative for the Concertación, assuming office in March of the following year.171 Frei
continued on Aylwin’s path of replacing Pinochet-era judges on the Supreme Court, appointing
seven of seventeen judges who brought new approaches, which resulted in the 1995 sentencing
of General Manuel Contreras, the former head of the DINA, and seven other members charged
as the architects of Orlando Letelier’s death.172 This seemingly progressive movement of the
courts halted in 1996 as a summary of cases details, “‘Although last year we reported that the
courts were divided over how and whether to apply the amnesty law, we now have to conclude
that the backsliding over the last year points to the consolidation of a sinister jurisprudence for
the goals of truth and justice.’”173 Further efforts by Frei attempted to reverse this. The
government issued a 1998 reform that expanded the number of seats from 17 to 21 and required
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that five ministers must have a legal degree and have practiced for at least 15 years outside of the
established judiciary.174 Further, Frei created the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, a
five-person taskforce in charge of hearing appeals against case closure that eventually turned into
an investigatory chamber, and altered the relationship between the criminal and military courts,
which turned over some cases to the civilian courts.175 This allowed for the important reopening
of the Poblete Córdova case on September 8, 1998 where the Supreme Court decided that the
international treaties (namely the Geneva Conventions) signed by Chile have supremacy in
Chilean law over the amnesty, for “if the regime considered itself in a state of war, argued the
proponents of this theory, they were obliged to act accordingly and respect the laws of war, and
were estopped from now arguing those rules did not apply.”176 Another important ruling, the
Parral case, in January 1999, found that cases of illegal detention or kidnapping constituted
continuous crimes and, therefore, extend past the dates of the amnesty law.177
In the international sphere, in June 1996, Joan Garcés and Manuel Murillo issued a
criminal complaint against General Pinochet and members of his command with charges of
genocide, terrorism, and torture.178 With the Argentine complaint filed months earlier, the
Chilean case differed in three ways: 1) this case had fewer suspects as a result of the centralized
repression, which allowed for a narrower agenda, 2) less public documents and a lower profile
judge in García Castellón, and 3) a single, unified legal team.179 The global community began to
actively support the Spanish case while the Chilean government did not acknowledge it until the
case progressed. The United States actively participated in the investigation after Judge García
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Castellón asked for information regarding the murder of Letelier, which led to new information
such as the severity of Operation Condor and the possibility for terrorist attacks by the DINA on
foreign soil, including acts in Spain.180 Weeks before Spain issued an international arrest warrant
for Pinochet, General Juan Fernando Torres Silva, one of his most trusted advisors, volunteered
to testify in front of Judge Castellón on October 3, 1998. Torres Silva claimed his intent as one to
underscore the necessity and legality of the actions of Pinochet’s regime; however, it validated
and legitimized the investigation.181
Pinochet flew to London on September 23, 1998 to receive treatment for a herniated disk;
however, this trip resulted in the culmination of international communication and partnership to
prosecute the dictator. With the international human rights community aware of Pinochet’s
upcoming trip; they collaborated to arrest him in London. On October 13, 1998, Garcés and
Enrique Santiago, a lawyer in the Argentine case, submitted briefs to Judges Castellón and
Garzón, outlining and describing the link of Operation Condor.182 In the following days, the
Judges requested, via Interpol, that the British authorities allow for the questioning of Pinochet
after his recovery from surgery.183 Due to a high level of uncertainty regarding diplomatic
immunity, the British police could not guarantee Pinochet’s presence without an arrest warrant;
therefore, on October 16, Judge Garzón—not the specific judge of the Chilean case—rapidly
issued the arrest warrant for crimes of genocide and terrorism, based on cases from Operation
Condor.184 The warrant immediately went to the office of Magistrate Nicholas Evans who swore
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out the warrant and, at 11 p.m., Scotland Yard arrested Pinochet at the London Clinic.185 The two
cases—Argentina and Chile—merged together under Judge Garzón in the following days.186
The arrest of Pinochet in London sparked controversy around the world, as some
approved and others condemned this measure. The European Parliament, the United Nations
Committee on Torture, and other states approved of such actions and urged extradition or
prosecution while others viewed this action as disregarding sovereignty.187 The Piquete de
Londres, the London protests, erupted after Pinochet’s arrest with Chileans and other Latin
Americans in exile communicating to discover where Pinochet remained and then holding vigils
outside the clinic with Chilean flags, candles, and posters of the disappeared.188 The exiles
greatly helped the efforts by bringing attention to the issue, raising global support, and assisting
the legal efforts through transcribing and translating the court hearings for journalists around the
world.189
However, issues arose as to the arrest warrant’s legitimacy as the Spanish warrant
charged Pinochet with crimes not available for extradition under British law. Garzón had to issue
a second warrant in line with British law that charged Pinochet with “torture and conspiracy to
torture from 1988 to 1992, with hostage-taking and conspiracy to take hostages from 1982 to
1992, and with conspiracy to murder from January 1976 to 1992.”190 Magistrate Ronald Bartle
approved the provisional warrant on October 23, and five days later three judges approved the
second warrant almost in its entirety, except for the count of conspiracy to murder.191 In Madrid,
the Court had to accept jurisdiction, which it did on October 30 after only one day of testimony.
185

Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 35.
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 35.
187
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 37.
188
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 38.
189
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 39.
190
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 42.
191
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 43.
186

Drucker 57
With Pinochet in London, the House of Lords had to rule on his extradition, which
Garzón asked for on November 4. After hearing oral arguments, mostly focused on the question
of immunity, the judges announced on November 25, Pinochet’s 83rd birthday, a three to two
decision to approve extradition.192 However, the judge who cast the deciding vote, Lord
Hoffman, had ties to Amnesty International, and although everyone concluded this had no
bearing on his decision, the House of Lords revoked the earlier decision and approved a new
trial.193 On March 25, 1999, after the second trial, the Lords announced a six to one decision that
stated Pinochet’s crimes as extraditable and his immunity did not extend to such crimes;
however, this slate of charges drastically reduced in size from the first.194 Home Secretary Jack
Straw reissued the authority to proceed with the extradition on April 5, setting in motion the
extradition hearings which allowed for cases prior to December 8, 1988 as “‘conspiracy is a
continuing offence” and determined that disappearances resulted in “‘mental torture’” for the
families.195 This hearing got the Chilean government more involved with the case, arguing for
respect for their sovereignty. Months after the hearing, the Chilean government called for
medical testing for Pinochet, asking for doctors to verify his mental deterioration and grant his
release.196 After the group of doctors evaluated Pinochet, they found him unfit for trial, which
resulted in the January 11, 2000 declaration by Straw to close the proceedings and Pinochet’s
return to Chile on March 3 with no extradition.197
Meanwhile, Chile had its third presidential elections on December 12, 1999, which
resulted in a close race between the Concertación candidate, Ricardo Lagos, and Joaquín Lavín,
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with the conservative Unión Demócrata Independiente—Independent Democratic Union. A runoff election occurred on January 16, 2000, where Ricardo Lagos won.198 This election divided
the right-wing parties and Pinochet, as Lavín pledged to distance himself from Pinochet
throughout his campaign.199 This weakened Pinochet’s standing in the country and undermined
his political relationships.
Before the end of Frei’s administration, he implemented the Mesa de Diálogo—Table for
Dialogue—that had “the generals, represented by the highest-level authority of the Army; across
from them the human rights layers; then the Church and other moral institutions of the country;
and finally a group of people who represented the political spectrum in Chile.”200 Each side of
the table had its own goals: the military believed the roundtable “offered a chance to end the
transition…[as] it would stop the parade of military officers before the courts and perhaps even
do away with the theory of kidnapping as a continuing crime,” the human rights lawyers and
their supporters wanted “new information on the location of the remaining detained/disappeared”
as well as “institutional recognition of the responsibility of the armed forces for the human rights
violations and a public commitment of the military to never engage in such acts again,” and the
religious leaders hoped for “national reconciliation.”201
The discussions had appeared to reach a culmination until Pinochet arrived back in Chile
and the army gave him a “hero’s welcome,” which angered the human rights activists.202
However, Lagos reunited the group and presented their agreement in a speech on June 13, 2000.
The declaration included a six-month period of investigation whereby the armed forces and
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police agreed to research and uncover information regarding the whereabout of the detaineddisappeared and give it to churches under an oath of secrecy who would then pass the
information to President Lagos.203 On January 7, 2001, President Lagos announced the findings
of the investigations: 200 cases of disappearances, 130 disposed in oceans, lakes, and rivers and
20 others in mass graves.204
After Pinochet’s arrival back to Chile, domestic cases against him accumulated. Within a
day of his departure from London, Gladys Marín filed the first complaint against Pinochet and by
the time he landed in Santiago, individuals had filed over 60 complaints—this number would
only rise.205 These cases included those from family members of victims of the Caravan of Death
charging murder, illegal burial, violations of the Geneva Conventions, and later kidnapping and
illegal association.206 All cases naming Pinochet as a defendant consolidated under Judge Juan
Guzmán Tapia of the Santiago Appeals Court.207 Guzmán tirelessly investigated the cases,
finding many cases of kidnapping—continuing crimes that sidestepped the amnesty law—and
ultimately issuing arrest warrants for members of the Caravan of Death: ex-General Arellano
Stark, ex-Colonel Sergio Arredondo, ex-Brigadier Pedro Espinoza, ex-Colonel Patrizio Díaz
Araneda and ex-Major Marcelo Manuel Moren Brito.208 On March 7, 2000, Guzmán petitioned
to revoke Pinochet’s immunity to investigate his involvement with the Caravan of Death and
charged him with kidnapping; on June 5, the Santiago Appeals Court stripped his parliamentary
immunity by a vote of 13 to 9 which the Supreme Court ratified by 14 to 6.209 At the end of the
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year, Guzmán indicted Pinochet with 18 counts of kidnapping and aggravated homicide in the
Caravan of Death cases and ordered him to house arrest.210 The country remained divided as
relatives of victims celebrated and his allies complained. Questions arose as to Pinochet’s
medical stability, so Guzmán went to Pinochet’s residence on January 22, 2001 to take his
statement and found him lucid, reissuing his indictment on January 29.211 Over a year after
Guzmán reissued his indictment, a panel of the Court of Appeals found Pinochet unfit to stand
trial due to subcortical dementia, resulting in the Supreme Court closing his case on July 1,
2002.212
After the ending of Pinochet’s trial, many people believed they had yet to voice their
experiences, so President Lagos created the Valech Commission, or the Comisión Nacional
Sobre Prisión Política y Tortura (National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture)
on September 26, 2003.213 President Lagos said of his decision to create the Valech Commission,
“those who had been in prison continued to argue that no one acknowledged what they had gone
through, and that when they asked for their record and it appeared that they had been prisoners,
they had to explain that they were prisoners because of their political ideas.”214
As opposed to the narrow scope of the Rettig Report, the Valech Commission
documented abuses of civil rights or politically motivated torture, identified victims, and
proposed recommendations. The Commission issued two reports (November 2004 and June
2005) as cases remained after the deadline for the first report. As a result of the first edition of
the report, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Juan Emilio Cheyre, officially took
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responsibility for the actions of the Army in November 2004: “The Army has taken the hard but
irreversible decision to assume responsibility as an institution in all punishable and morally
unacceptable acts of the past.”215 This demonstrated the wide-sweeping change happening in
Chile regarding the acceptance of the past and the human rights violations that occurred
throughout the dictatorship.
As a free man, Pinochet appeared on a Miami TV station, declaring he had done nothing
wrong.216 This interview incentivized Guzmán to indict Pinochet on 20 charges of
disappearances in conjunction with Operation Condor, as he clearly demonstrated he could stand
trial.217 On August 26, 2004, the Supreme Court again stripped Pinochet of his immunity by a
close nine to eight vote.218 Around the same time, the United States found that Pinochet had “125
illicit bank accounts with over US$20 million.”219 By the time of his death on December 10,
2006, Pinochet had around 300 criminal charges still pending against him.220
Chile has continued its efforts for justice, which includes the continual search for those
disappeared and trials for perpetrators that worked within the Pinochet regime. As of June 2019,
the country found and identified 307 detained-disappeared individuals.221
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
“There may be times when we are powerless to prevent injustice, but there must never be a time
when we fail to protest.”
Elie Wiesel (Holocaust survivor and activist)
This section will present and analyze the data to evaluate the hypotheses posed that
attempt to answer the question: Why do civilian governments of newly democratic countries
respond differently to the human rights violations that occurred during their dictatorships?
Before analyzing the hypotheses, this paper will discuss the classifications as democracy
or dictatorship of the countries over time. Argentina’s dictatorial period from 1976 to 1983
presents as Not Free during the middle years (1977 to 1982) and Partly Free during the first and
last year (1976 and 1983) according to Freedom House.222 From 1984 to 2020, Freedom House
has classified Argentina as Free, except for 2001 to 2003 at which time a crisis occurred in the
country.223 Between 1976 and 1982, Argentina received a 0 for democracy, a 9 for autocracy (8
in 1982), and a Polity2 score of -9 (-8 for 1982) according to the Polity IV dataset.224 Since 1983,
Argentina has received 7, 8, or 9 for democracy and Polity2 and 0 for autocracy, signifying a
permanence of democracy in the country after the dictatorship.225 The Democracy and
Dictatorship data set scored Argentina as a democracy from 1983 to 2007 (end of the dataset),
scoring it as a military dictatorship from 1976 to 1982.226 TJRC has similar scoring to the
Democracy and Dictatorship data set, finding Argentina Autocratic from 1976 to 1982.227 Table
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3 shows the data from the four sources for Argentina: Freedom House, Polity IV, Democracy
and Dictatorship, and the TJRC.
Similarly, Chile received the classification of Not Free from 1974 to 1979, Partly Free
from 1980 to 1989, and Free in 1973 and between 1990 and 2020.228 Interestingly, a period of
dictatorship (1980-1989) scores as Partly Free for Freedom House. As for Chile, the scores
varied from 1973 to 1990: between 1973 and 1982, the country received a 0 for democracy, 7 for
autocracy and a Polity2 score of -7; between 1983 and 1987, Polity IV gave Chile a 0 for
democracy, 6 for autocracy and -6 for Polity2; in 1988, Chile received a 2 for democracy, 3 for
autocracy and -1 for Polity2; and in 1989 and 1990, an 8 for democracy, 0 for autocracy and 8
for Polity2.229 After the dictatorship, Chile received Polity2 scores of 8, 9, and 10, with its first
10 in 2005.230 The range in scores mirrors the disparity in Freedom House. As for Chile, the
Democracy and Dictatorship data finds a military dictatorship from 1973 to 1989 and democracy
from 1990 to the end of the data in 2007.231 The change in scores for Chile such as from Not
Free to Partly Free for Freedom House in 1980 likely corresponds with the 1980 Constitution
that implemented plebiscites as well as the decline in human rights violations that occurred
earlier in the dictatorship while the change in a Polity2 score of -1 in 1988 aligns with the victory
of the No campaign. Table 4 mirrors that of Table 3 but for Chile.
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Table 3: Democracy Data for Argentina

Year

Freedom
House

Polity IV
(Polity2)

Democracy
and
Dictatorship

Year

0

Transitional
Justice
Research
Collaborative
Autocratic

Freedom
House

Polity IV
(Polity2)

Democracy
and
Dictatorship

1989

Free

7

1

Transitional
Justice
Research
Collaborative
Democratic

1976

Partly Free

-9

1977

Not Free

-9

0

Autocratic

1990

Free

7

1

Democratic

1978

Not Free

-9

0

Autocratic

1991

Free

7

1

Democratic

1979

Not Free

-9

0

Autocratic

1992

Free

7

1

Democratic

1980

Not Free

-9

0

Autocratic

1993

Free

7

1

Democratic

1981

Not Free

-8

0

Autocratic

1994

Free

7

1

Democratic

1982

Not Free

-8

0

Autocratic

1995

Free

7

1

Democratic

1983

Partly Free

8

1

Democratic

1996

Free

7

1

Democratic

1984

Free

8

1

Democratic

1997

Free

7

1

Democratic

1985

Free

8

1

Democratic

1998

Free

7

1

Democratic

1986

Free

8

1

Democratic

1999

Free

8

1

Democratic

1987

Free

8

1

Democratic

2000

Free

8

1

Democratic

1988

Free

8

1

Democratic

2001

Partly
Free

8

1

Democratic
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Year

Freedom
House

Polity IV
(Polity2)

Democracy
and
Dictatorship

Year

1

Transitional
Justice
Research
Collaborative
Democratic

Freedom
House

Polity IV
(Polity2)

Democracy
and
Dictatorship

2012

Free

8

1

Transitional
Justice
Research
Collaborative
——————

2002

Partly Free

8

2003

Partly Free

8

1

Democratic

2013

Free

8

1

——————

2004

Free

8

1

Democratic

2014

Free

8

1

——————

2005

Free

8

1

Democratic

2015

Free

9

1

——————

2006

Free

8

1

Democratic

2016

Free

9

1

——————

2007

Free

8

1

Democratic

2017

Free

9

1

——————

2008

Free

8

1

Democratic

2018

Free

9

1

——————

2009

Free

8

1

Democratic

2019

Free

———

1

——————

2010

Free

8

1

Democratic

2020

Free

———

2011

Free

8

1

——————

——————
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Table 4: Democracy Data for Chile

Year

Freedom
House

Polity IV
(Polity2)

Democracy
and
Dictatorship

Year

0

Transitional
Justice
Research
Collaborative
—————

Freedom
House

Polity IV
(Polity2)

Democracy
and
Dictatorship

1986

Partly Free

-6

0

Transitional
Justice
Research
Collaborative
—————

1973

Free

-7

1974

Not Free

-7

0

—————

1987

Partly Free

-6

0

—————

1975

Not Free

-7

0

—————

1988

Partly Free

-1

0

—————

1976

Not Free

-7

0

—————

1989

Partly Free

8

0

Democratic

1977

Not Free

-7

0

—————

1990

Free

8

1

Democratic

1978

Not Free

-7

0

—————

1991

Free

8

1

Democratic

1979

Not Free

-7

0

—————

1992

Free

8

1

Democratic

1980

Partly Free

-7

0

—————

1993

Free

8

1

Democratic

1981

Partly Free

-7

0

—————

1994

Free

8

1

Democratic

1982

Partly Free

-7

0

—————

1995

Free

8

1

Democratic

1983

Partly Free

-6

0

—————

1996

Free

8

1

Democratic

1984

Partly Free

-6

0

—————

1997

Free

8

1

Democratic

1985

Partly Free

-6

0

—————

1998

Free

8

1

Democratic
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Year

Freedom
House

Polity IV
(Polity2)

Democracy
and
Dictatorship

Year

1

Transitional
Justice
Research
Collaborative
Democratic

Freedom
House

Polity IV
(Polity2)

Democracy
and
Dictatorship

2010

Free

10

—————

Transitional
Justice
Research
Collaborative
Democratic

1999

Free

8

2000

Free

9

1

Democratic

2011

Free

10

—————

—————

2001

Free

9

1

Democratic

2012

Free

10

—————

—————

2002

Free

9

1

Democratic

2013

Free

10

—————

—————

2003

Free

9

1

Democratic

2014

Free

10

—————

—————

2004

Free

9

1

Democratic

2015

Free

10

—————

—————

2005

Free

9

1

Democratic

2016

Free

10

—————

—————

2006

Free

10

1

Democratic

2017

Free

10

—————

—————

2007

Free

10

1

Democratic

2018

Free

10

—————

—————

2008

Free

10

1

Democratic

2019

Free

———

—————

—————

2009

Free

10

—————

Democratic

2020

Free

———

—————

—————

Overall, the data aligns with the social discourse and history defining the periods of
dictatorship and democracy of the countries as 1976 to the beginning of 1983 for Argentina and
1973 to 1990 for Chile. The data also shows that Chile has had a more stable democracy than
Argentina, constantly receiving Free from Freedom House and higher Polity2 scores from Polity
IV after the end of the dictatorships—Argentina has not received a 10 Polity2 score. Figure 4
shows the comparison of the two countries’ Polity2 scores.
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Figure 4: Polity2 Scores from 1972 to 2018 (Monty Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers)

Before analyzing the hypotheses, the paper will quantify justice using in-state reports and
TJRC data. As of 2018, 3,081 people have been under the judicial process in Argentina (Figure
5): 1,024 people have been sentenced—891 of whom have been convicted and 133 acquitted—
while 537 have died during the process.232 In Chile, between 1995 and June 30, 2019, 426 human
rights lawsuits for 747 detained-disappeared and executed individuals and 221 survivors reached
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a final sentence, 61 for civil compensation and 365 criminal cases.233 Over the past ten years, the
Supreme Court witnessed more than half (295) of these cases. These sentences correspond to
around 23.2% of the recognized disappeared and executed individuals while only responding to
1.1% of torture victims.234 Figure 6 demonstrates the types of cases and sentences involved;
Figure 7 outlines the results of the cases from July 2010 to June 2019 regarding the human rights
cases spanning the period of 1973 to 1990.
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Figure 5: Persons investigated for crimes against humanity, according to the highest procedural situation achieved (Informe
Estadístico Sobre el Estado de Las Causas Por Delitos de Lesa Humanidad En Argentina Diagnóstico 2018)
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The Transitional Justice Research Collaborative analyzes the total number of
prosecutions and guilty verdicts per country. Figure 8 demonstrates the total number of
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prosecutions held in each country per year while Figure 9 sums these total numbers to arrive at
the total number of prosecutions held in each country from all prior years. Figure 8 interestingly
shows that when international pressure against Pinochet began in 1999, the trials surged in Chile.
It also demonstrates that the largest surge in Argentina occurred between 2007 and 2009. The
upward sloping curves in Figure 9 highlight that the total prosecutions continued to grow over
time. During the analyzed time periods Argentina had 54 total trials and Chile had 33; this
demonstrates the advantage Argentina had in transitioning before Chile.235 Creating an average
number of prosecutions per year removes this time advantage, still revealing Argentina (1.92)
had more prosecutions per year than Chile (1.5). Figure 10 shows that Argentine courts reached
24 guilty verdicts and Chilean courts 14 during the studied time periods, meaning 44% of
Argentine and 42% of Chilean prosecutions resulted in a guilty verdict.236
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Figure 8: Number of Prosecutions (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative)

235
236

Leigh A. Payne et al.
Leigh A. Payne et al.

09
10
20

20

07
08

Chile

20

20

05
06
20

20

03
04
20

20

01
02
20

20

99
00
20

19

97
98

Argentina

19

19

95
96
19

19

93
94
19

19

91
92
19

19

89
90
19

19

87
88
19

19

85
86
19

19

19

19

83
84

0

Drucker 72
60
50
40
30
20
10

Argentina

10

20

08
09
20

20

06
07
20

20

04
05
20

20

02
03
20

20

00
01
20

20

98
99
19

19

96
97
19

19

94
95
19

19

92
93
19

19

90
91
19

19

88
89
19

19

86
87
19

19

19

19

84
85

0

Chile

Figure 9: Lagged Prosecutions Sum (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative)
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Figure 10: Lagged Guilty Verdicts Sum (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative)

The combined data from the country reports and TJRC shows that Argentina started its
justice process immediately after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1983 and continued to have
more prosecutions and convictions than Chile. However, this does not diminish the existence of
justice in Chile.
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TESTING HYPOTHESES
After confirming through data the periods of democracy and dictatorship and the levels of
justice in each country, the paper will test and analyze the six hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Severity of Violence
As postulated earlier, the degree of human rights abuses during the dictatorship matter to
the transitional justice policies implemented by a democratic government. The CIRI Data Project
begins its analysis in 1981, meaning this set does not account for the beginning of each
dictatorship. Argentina quickly jumped from a physical integrity rights index of 1 in 1981 to a 5
in 1982 and 6 in 1983 while Chile had scores of 3 and below for 1981 to 1990, except for a 4 in
1988.237 Figure 11 shows the fluctuation of respect for physical integrity rights in the countries
after the dictatorships ended in 1983 and 1990 respectively, noting a steadier incline for Chile
than Argentina.
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Figure 11: Physical Integrity Rights Index 1981-2011 (David Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay)
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The Latent Human Rights Protection scores demonstrate that Argentina experienced
worse human rights violations during its dictatorship than Chile: Figure 12. Argentina’s worst
year, 1977, received a lower score (-3.065) than Chile’s worst year of 1974 (-3.032).238 Figure 12
also shows Chile’s faster progression towards respecting human rights violations than
Argentina’s. However, the paper emphasizes the highest scoring of 5.4, meaning both countries
with scores around 1 in the more recent years do not have the highest respect for human rights in
the world setting.
2.2
1.2

2016

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

-0.8

1972

0.2

-1.8
-2.8
-3.8
Argentina

Chile

Figure 12: Latent Human Rights Protection Scores 1972-2017 (Schnakenberg and Fariss)

The last data source measuring physical integrity rights, PTS, takes information from
three sources; however, only Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department issued reports
on torture from 1976 to 2018 as Human Rights Watch began in 2013. Figure 13A plots the data
received from Amnesty International reports. It shows that in the beginning years of the
Argentine dictatorship, “terror expanded to the whole population” with widespread torture and
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other human rights violations.239 This remained the case for a majority of the dictatorship until
the final years when the country reached a score of 3 in the final two years. The PTS does not
have data for the beginning years of the Chilean dictatorship (1973-1975) when widespread
violations occurred; however, Figure 13A shows that the country fluctuated between a 4 and 5
until 1988 when it scored a 3. U.S. State Reports (Figure 13B) resulted in slightly different data
on the PTS scoring system, rating Argentina as a 4—"Civil and political rights violations have
expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.”—for the majority of the dictatorship until the last two years when the
country received a 3. Interestingly, the U.S. State Reports score Chile 3 or 4 for the duration of
the dictatorship except for in 1986 when the country received a 5. Both organizations
demonstrated that the countries fluctuated from 1 to 3 in the years after their dictatorship, with
higher scores coming from Argentina—seen in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Political Terror Scale from Amnesty International (A) and U.S. State Reports (B) (Mark Gibney et al.)

The last sources of data regarding the heinousness of the human rights violations comes
from reports executed within the countries as a result of presidential orders including Nunca Más
(Argentina), the Rettig Report (Chile), and the Valech Report (Chile). Nunca Más provides
narratives as well as data regarding the actions of the Argentine Junta, stating that the list “is a
partial one” as many of the records disappeared with the individuals.240 The report finds 8,960
people disappeared—but estimates now believe 30,000 disappeared—in 340 secret detention
centers.241 The Rettig Report from Chile issued similar stories from those in Nunca Más, finding
3,428 cases of disappearances, killing, torture, and kidnapping.242 The second truth finding report
in Chile, the Valech Commission, found a total of 28,461 victims amounting to 34,690
detentions, as some had suffered multiple detentions.243 Additionally, 68.57% of detentions
occurred in the year 1973 after the September 11 coup, 18.53% occurred between 1974 and
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August 1977, and 12.90% occurred after 1977 until the end of the dictatorship—shown in Figure
14.244

12.90%
18.53%
68.57%

1973 (23,788)

1974-1977 (6,428)

1977-1990 (4,474)

Figure 14: Total detentions by percentage: 34,698 detentions considered; 28,459 victims considered (Valech Report)

The data from the various sources aligns with the first hypothesis that higher levels of
atrocities and violations will result in more justice. As both countries experienced massive
human rights violations that spanned nearly the entire dictatorships, the existence of trials in both
countries aligns with the hypothesis. Figure 12 demonstrates the slightly worse human rights
situation in Argentina than in Chile and as Argentina had trials to prosecute the perpetrators
within the first years after its dictatorship—faster than in Chile—and has had a larger quantity
further strengthens the validity of the first hypothesis. In other words, the severity of human
rights violations motivates justice, in timing of trials and quantity of convictions.
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Hypothesis 2: Type of Transition
The second hypothesis relies on scholarly analysis of history. As demonstrated during the
timelines of each country, the Argentine Junta experienced a transition by collapse as a result of
both internal—division between the branches of the military, increase in number and strength of
human rights movements, an economic crisis—and external—the loss of the Falkland Islands
War—factors. Whereas in Chile, on the other hand, Pinochet negotiated his transition from
power through the 1980 Constitution and its subsequent 1988 plebiscite. The devastated
Argentine dictators therefore remained without power and protection, making trials easier in the
beginning of its transitionary phase. With Pinochet retaining some power and influence over the
military, judicial, and legislative bodies, the new government faced more tribulations to try the
perpetrators in Chile immediately after the end of the dictatorship. This factor, however, does not
explain the longevity of transitional justice as Chile had successful trials and prosecutions.
Therefore, as the second hypothesis emphasizes, immediate actions for justice will occur in
countries that suffered a transition by collapse and not negotiation; however, it cannot predict
justice in the long term.

Hypothesis 3: Legal Status
Judicial independence can highlight the type of legal status in a country because it
demonstrates the availability of the system and its connection to the departing dictatorship. CIRI
codifies such a measure and demonstrates the legacy of the dictatorships in the judicial system.
This measure directly applies to after the dictatorship. After the Argentine dictatorship,
Argentina has largely had a partially independent system except for in 1985-1986 and 1988-1989
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with a generally independent judiciary.245 Chile’s judiciary, however, has become more
independent over time. Immediately after the end of the dictatorship, the country had a partially
independent system, except for 1994; this changed in 2000 when it became generally
independent.246 Figure 15 displays this comparison.
Argentina faced a generally independent legal system in the beginning of its democracy,
with a separation of undue military/dictatorial influence and the law, which could account for the
existence of trials against perpetrators. However, this plateaued and even decreased as the
dictatorship moved farther into history. Chile, on the other hand, did not have this separation for
at least 10 years after the end of the dictatorship, which aligns with the timeline of the most
important trials against the perpetrators of violations.
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Figure 15: Judicial Independence Scores (David Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay)

Other groups have research judicial independence, including TJRC. The judicial
independence measure from TJRC follows Keith’s dataset, which has an emphasis on de facto
independence. Figure 16 shows similar data to that of Figure 15 with certain key information.
245
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For Argentina, figure 16 shows a similar fluctuation between 1984 and 1990 to that of Figure 15;
how the scores do not plateau as partially independent until 1994. The period between 1992 and
1996 shows Chile did not have an independent judiciary in Figure 16 while it had a partially
independent system in Figure 15. This difference likely corresponds to the emphasis on de facto
independence, as the Chilean judiciary still had many members of Pinochet’s regime in power
and the new judiciary policies emerged in 1997.
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Figure 16: Keith Judicial Independence Scores (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative)

The last measure of judicial independence comes from Linzer and Staton, rating the
countries from 0 to 1 (Figure 17). This paper emphasizes that scores around 0.8 represent
generally independent judiciaries. Therefore, Figure 17 highlights the fluctuation of Argentine
judiciary independence as seen in the previous two figures that levelled off at partially
independent around 1990 as well as shows the increase in independence immediately after the
end of the dictatorship (1983-1986). Chile, however, exits its dictatorial period partially
independent and slowly becomes more independent over time, as the legacy of Pinochet
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diminishes with each passing year of democracy and democratic policies until 2000 when it
becomes generally independent—all of which mirrors the information in the prior two figures.
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Figure 17: Judicial Independence Scores (Linzer-Staton)

The data appears to confirm the third hypothesis that a continuous legal structure where
the former dictators maintain power and influence on the judiciary system have slower justice
policies than a system without such influence. It took Chile nearly 10 years after the end of the
dictatorship to have a generally independent judiciary that could hold fair and impartial trials
against the Junta. Despite lower levels of independence seen in Figure 17, Argentina had a
generally independent judiciary immediately following the collapse of the dictatorship. This
paper emphasizes that other attributes besides dictatorial legacy impact the degree of judicial
independence and notes that Argentina has a consistently partially independent system likely due
to its history or political instability.247
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Hypothesis 4: Role of Executive
As noted earlier, the independence of the judiciary impacts the autonomy and authority of
the executive. This section will consider the data and information presented in the above section
in addition to data from Polity IV that discusses executive constraint. Figure 18 demonstrates the
degree of executive constraints in the final years of the dictatorships to 2018. A score of one
represents the dictatorial period. Argentina faced many challenges. Immediately after the end of
the dictatorship, Polity IV finds executive parity in the country, but this fluctuates to scores of 5
and 6, meaning substantial and intermediate equality, until 2016.248 After the 1988 plebiscite,
Chile rises which connotes the beginning of change and then the country spikes into executive
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Figure 18: Executive Constraints (Monty Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers)

This information supports the fourth hypothesis when combined with the level of judicial
independence seen above. The level of constraints represents the concentration of authority of
the president; therefore, a higher score equates to lower levels of authority. According to the
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fourth hypothesis, more authority and decision-making autonomy in the executive will allow for
more transitional justice, as the military—or other accountability groups—can exert undue
influence and alter justice policies. An independent judiciary acts as an accountability group and,
therefore, can work in tandem with an equal executive branch to exert justice.
Immediately after the end of the dictatorship, Argentina had an independent judiciary and
executive parity; however, both began to waver in the long term as the legal system had partial
independence and the executive had more authority, a sign of its historical political instability.
Argentina’s executive constraint scores, therefore, would lead one to assume less success with
transitional justice policies. However, unlike the Polity IV scores that do not name the
accountability groups placing constraints on the executive, this paper assumes that the
independent judiciary during this time period acts as the constraint as the military did not have
the power to do so. This allows for a higher level of decision-making autonomy in the executive,
as the legal system would not interfere as an independent body. Argentina therefore lands in the
B square of Figure 1 from Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux with high levels of decision-making
autonomy and low levels of authority. The pattern of justice follows as well; Argentina had a
high influx of trials against perpetrators in the beginning years, but that tapered off as the
judiciary became less independent—autonomy decreased—and the authority of the executive
faltered.
This thesis contends that the stability of Chilean scores in Figure 18 suffers from the
inability to decipher the accountability groups exercising constraints on the executive. The
history of the country and its judicial independence scores, however, allow for the paper to
deduce the military as the accountability group for the first decade after the dictatorship. This
constraint greatly differs from an independent legal system constraint as those aligned with the
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dictatorship face prosecution from transitional justice policies and would, consequentially,
oppose such actions. Therefore, the low level of authority of the Chilean executive and low level
of decision-making autonomy due to the influence of the post-dictatorial regime in positions of
power, Chile did not have many successful justice policies in the beginning of its democracy, as
in quadrant D of Figure 1. While the country did initiate the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission during this time, its publication Nunca Más described its shortcomings as a result of
destroyed or withheld information.
Overall, the combination of judicial independence and the level of authority and
autonomy of the executives in both Argentina and Chile align with the fourth hypothesis: higher
levels of autonomy and authority of the executive allow for greater success in justice policies.

Hypothesis 5: International Pressure
Along with information presented in the timelines of each country, specifically the role of
Spain and the United Kingdom in a trial against Pinochet, international organizations’ actions in
a given country demonstrate international pressure. Human rights organizations like the United
Nations, Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) act as pillars for the transnational advocacy networks
that join the efforts of individuals, civil society groups, NGOs, and non-profit organizations to
advocate for change.
The UN has issued reports on both countries from various sectors of the organization.
Some examples about Argentina include “Question of the human rights of all persons subjected
to any form of detention or imprisonment, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment” by the Special Rapporteur, Nigel S. Rodly, to the
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Commission on Human Rights and Security Council Resolution 502 that urges Argentina to
withdraw from the Falkland Islands. As for Chile, the UN, from the General Assembly to the
Economic and Social Council, has issued around 60 resolutions and decisions regarding the
dictatorship and the human rights system in the country beginning in 1974 and continuing into
the 2000s.
The first action from AI in Argentina occurred when a delegation visited the country in
November 1976 and issued a report discussed above. The organization continues with its reports
and activism regarding the Argentine dictatorship, periodically issuing reports on the topic and
the human rights abuses present. Similarly, AI issued its first report on Chile in 1974, which
discusses Allende and the Junta, focusing on the human rights abuses occurring as a result of the
dictatorship.249 AI continued to issue reports and campaigns that addressed the human rights
abuses, specifically torture and disappearances, until 2008. The first HRW reports on both
Argentina and Chile came out in 1991. HRW has issued few reports on either country relating to
the dictatorships, with the last in 2001 for Argentina and 2005 for Chile. The PTS also helps
articulate the amount and frequency of reports from AI and HRW as well as the U.S. State
Reports. As the PTS began in 1976, it has scores for both countries from AI and U.S. State
reports but not for HRW. Further, the IACHR issued its first country report on Argentina in
1980, with its first visit in 1976, and on Chile in 1975 after a 1974 visit. The IACHR issued other
reports on the countries, discussing the human rights concerns in each.
The largest amount of international pressure exerted on either country occurred between
1996 and 2000 when Spain and the United Kingdom worked in tandem to prosecute Pinochet.
This experience demonstrated to Chile, and the global community, the impact of a strong, united
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exiled community as well as the strength of universal jurisdiction. It greatly incentivized Chile to
begin its own investigations and trials as the world learned about the heinousness of the
dictatorship and pleaded for justice. The data regarding involvement of international
organizations demonstrates that these reports existed since the beginning of the dictatorships,
highlighting the human rights violations and calling for a change; therefore, their impact on
justice remains unclear. The case of Chile provides an example of the impact of international
pressure on domestic enforcement, meaning the fifth hypothesis has merit; however, the strength
of transnational advocacy networks on exerting this positive force requires further investigation.

Hypothesis 6: Diffusion Theory
The geographical proximity and many cultural similarities, specifically a common
language and religion, makes Argentina and Chile an excellent case study of the efficacy and
validity of the diffusion theory. According to the timelines of each country and data presented
above, Argentina had trials within the first years after the end of the dictatorship, while domestic
Chilean trials did not occur until many years into the democracy. This would imply that trials
existed in Argentina many years before Chile. One could then postulate that the success of the
trials in condemning perpetrators and relieving the society of this weight influenced Chile.
Figure 19 shows the percentage of countries in the region that had prosecutions in each year. As
mentioned earlier, all of the Southern Cone countries and many other South American countries
suffered from dictatorships during a similar time period. All of these countries transitioned to
democracy before Chile, so the diffusion theory accounts for not just the impact of Argentina on
its neighbor but also the other geographically proximate and culturally similar countries in the
region. Figure 19 data confirms diffusion theory because the percentage increases over time,
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implying that more countries within the region used trials in their transitional justice policies.
Figures 8, 9, and 10 demonstrate that successful prosecutions (meaning those that resulted in
guilty verdicts) began in Argentina before Chile; therefore, following the diffusion theory, this
paper argues that Argentina, and other countries with prosecutions throughout the region,
influenced Chile to adopt similar policies.
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Figure 19: Regional Prosecutions (Transitional Justice Research Collaborative)

In conclusion, Table 5 articulates the validity of the hypotheses according to the data
presented.
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Table 5: Summary of Findings

Hypothesis 1: Severity of Violence

Hypothesis 2: Type of Transition

Confirmed: Severe human rights abuses result in
justice policies with more heinous case (Argentina)
having prosecutions sooner.
Confirmed: Transitions that result from collapse
will take more immediate transitional justice
policies than those with a pacted transition;
however, this cannot predict long-term responses.

Hypothesis 3: Legal Status

Confirmed: A continuous legal structure where the
former dictatorial regime maintains power and
influence over the judiciary will have fewer and less
successful justice policies in the short-term.

Hypothesis 4: Role of executive

Confirmed: High levels of executive autonomy and
authority allow for greater success in justice
policies.
Mixed results: International pressure can advocate
for and influence countries to execute justice
policies; however, the specific impact of
transnational advocacy networks on incentivization
requires more research.

Hypothesis 5: International Pressure

Hypothesis 6: Diffusion Theory

Confirmed: The diffusion theory can account for
trials flowing from one geographically proximate
and/or culturally similar country to another given
success in the primary.
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CONCLUSION
“We know that peace is only possible when it is the fruit of justice. True peace is a profound
transformation by means of the force of nonviolence that is the power of love.”
(Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Survivor and 1980 Nobel Peace Prize Recipient)
This thesis has analyzed possible explanatory variables for varying responses to human
rights abuses caused by dictatorships, using Argentina and Chile as case studies. It finds that 1)
the severity of violence during the dictatorships, 2) the type of transition, 3) the legal structure,
4) the role of the executive, and 5) diffusion theory explain the justice policies in the short and
long-term. International pressure has influenced these policies as well; however, more data must
exist to determine the extent of its sway.
Argentina and Chile had interestingly different responses—both in policy and society—to
the grave dictatorships in their respective countries; however, this paper begins the analysis to
explain the structural differences, with a focus on the existence of trials against the perpetrators
of the abuses. The first democratic government of Argentina could implement trials quickly
because of the heinousness of the violations by the Junta, the collapse of the dictatorial regime,
the restored legal structure with high levels of judicial independence in the first democratic
years, and high levels of executive authority. Argentina’s transitional justice policies declined for
many years because the political situation changed, and the country began to separate itself from
its past. Chile had an opposite approach. The beginning years of its democracy remained in the
shadow of Pinochet’s presence as he maintained power in the judiciary, legislature, and military.
The country began most of its transitional justice policies after the first decade of democracy,
when the judiciary gained independence, other countries in the region had begun to implement
prosecutions, and the international community nearly prosecuted Pinochet in Europe. With both
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dictatorships 30 years in the past, Chile appears to have recovered more stability in these
political measures, specifically judicial independence and executive constraints; however, this
paper contends that the tumultuous Argentine history continues to impact the political stability in
the country and such a history does not exist in Chile.
This paper, however, does not end the study on the differences of Argentina and Chile
with respect to their responses to the dictatorship. Many societal differences exist as well,
especially in terms of public opinion and attitude towards the military regimes. Therefore, a
future study could analyze the societal perceptions of the dictatorships and the transitional justice
policies enacted as well as the process of memorialization. Furthermore, the dictatorship
impacted different groups of people in drastically different ways, so this paper recommends an
analysis of the dictatorial effect on minorities, specifically the multitude of indigenous
populations in both countries.
Many countries have suffered from dictatorships and mass human rights abuses, making
this thesis widely applicable to the global community. However, this thesis should provide as one
example within a broader scholarly body to evaluate the variables that impact transitional justice
policies. Further, scholars can utilize this thesis as a baseline to potentially predict the outcomes
of countries currently undergoing dictatorships or transitions to democracy. Despite the focus on
two countries, its findings expand past the Southern Cone and South America to the international
arena.
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